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CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF RISK AND
THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS
Molly J. Walker Wilson*
ABSTRACT
Every year, law-makers and agency regulators, with the input of industry experts
and scientists, make hundreds of decisions about how to regulate conduct and
allocate resources to address various types of risks that threaten the well-being of
American citizens. In fact, managing and minimizing risk is one of the most
important tasks of today’s policy-makers. In spite of this fact, most actions are taken
without systematic consideration of the preferences of the very people whose welfare
is at stake. There are two reasons for this. First, the dominance of Traditional Risk
Analysis, with its emphasis on statistics and cost-benefit analysis, has downplayed
the role of values and subjectivity in risk management. The result has been that risk
decisions have been based upon the erroneous assumption that empirical data and
mathematical calculations alone are adequate bases for risk decisions. There has
been virtually no acknowledgment that ex ante consideration of the convictions and
passions of the public is valuable. In fact, a number of scholars have argued that
because individuals become emotional about potential harms, scientific experts
should make all risk decisions without any public involvement at all. Another
consequence of the focus on traditional risk analysis is that no comprehensive model
of public risk perception has been developed. Existing theoretical perspectives and
methodologies have not offered a comprehensive model, and each has suffered from
limitations of one kind or another. This Article argues that law makers cannot
adequately manage risks without understanding how members of the public view and
react to these risks. In an effort to provide specific guidance for future risk decisions,
the Article synthesizes past risk perception research and theory in order to offer a
comprehensive risk perception model. This model should serve as a tool for risk
managers and policy-makers, and a catalyst for future normative risk management
debate.

INTRODUCTION
The interaction between risk events and social processes makes it clear that . .
. risk has meaning only to the extent that it treats how people think about the
world and its relationships. Thus, there is no such thing as “true” (absolute)
and “distorted” (socially determined) risk. Rather the information system and
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characteristics of public responses that compose social amplification are
essential elements in determining the nature and magnitude of risk.1
Risk management decisions are not being made . . . in part because there are
no clear criteria.2

Each day, Americans live with risk-management laws and policies that
have been formulated by lawmakers who lack the most basic understanding how
Americans view and react to these risks. Although the United States was founded
on the notion that individual citizens have the fundamental right to govern their
own existence and make independent informed choices, decisions about how to
manage national security, pollutants in our water, speed limits, and health and
safety standards in eating establishments and workplaces, are decided by a few,
on behalf of many. The allocation of responsibility for such decisions to a
particular group of individuals is inevitable; few would argue that every public
risk decision should be put to a vote of the people. Nevertheless, decisions about
how to manage risk—defined as the potential for harm from various sources—are
inherently value-laden judgment calls. The very fact that risks are potential
makes them unknowable, at least with any kind of certainty; their short and longterm consequences are hard to gauge. Because it is impossible to address and
eliminate all risks simultaneously, difficult decisions must be made with respect
to which pose the most significant threat, and which negative consequences are
the most terrible. While expert analysis and prediction can give us best guesses as
to how future events might unfold, it cannot anticipate human fear, nor can it
evaluate two harms with equivalent expected costs to determine objectively which
is worse. This Article synthesizes past research and theory in the area of
individual and public risk perception to derive a model of risk perception that may
serve as a tool for risk managers and law makers in understanding how
individuals think about, comprehend, and evaluate risks.
Although daily life and governance3 involve myriad decisions, choices
about how to respond to risks are some of the most important decisions human
beings make. From the homebuyer evaluating the terms of a loan, to the
lawmaker deciding whether to vote for a declaration of war, individuals make
risky decisions in a seemingly infinite variety of contexts. Moreover, when
evaluating the potential for future harm, the choices we make often have profound
implications for future outcomes, including those affecting generations to come.
Human comfort and survival are not the only considerations implicated by our
choices. Recently, there has been a growing awareness of how our actions impact
the earth, air, water sources, and plant and animal life. Risky decisions influence
1

Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, et al. The Social Amplification of Risk: A
Conceptual Framework, 8, 2 Risk Analysis 177, 181 (1988).
2
Paul Slovic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 21 (2000) (hereinafter, “PERCEPTION”).
3
“Simply put ‘governance’ means “the process of decision-making and the process by which
decisions
are
implemented
(or
not
implemented).”
See
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited, Aug.
28, 2010).
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many facets of life, and involve gauging outcomes that are difficult to predict,
even with reasonably good data, making the wisdom of any particular course of
action speculative. And yet, it is impossible to avoid making these difficult
choices. Once a threat has been identified, failure to set a course of action is
usually a choice in and of itself.
Although there is an abundance of literature on how risks should be
measured, managed, controlled, and calculated, surprising little has been written
on how stakeholders—individuals who are affected by potential harms—evaluate
and react to potential threats. When risk management proposals are advanced,
they are usually presented exclusively in terms of probabilities and costs. To a
great extent, factors exogenous to the conscious decision task, such as human
emotion and cognitive processes, are ignored. Decision tasks are treated as if
there is a correct answer upon which all could agree, if only complete data were
available. Rarely is risk understood as a culturally defined force, interpreted by
human beings who bring their own understandings and preferences to the table.
However, recent empirical and theoretical contributions from sociology,
psychology, and anthropology make it clear that the very act of perceiving and
evaluating a danger is a complex, multi-faceted process. Several theoretical and
empirical perspectives on risk perception have been offered by influential thinkers
such as Paul Slovic, Roger Kasperson, Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein,
Ulrich Beck, and Mary Douglas, among others. Nevertheless, research on how
individuals think about risk has failed to converge on a comprehensive model of
risk perception. In part, this failure has arisen because discussions have
emphasized either the specific characteristics of the risks or the social
mechanisms underlying public panics. Analysis of the interaction of these two
aspects of risk perception is sparse.4 Although each of the various primary
approaches to investigating and understanding risk perception make important
contributions, to date, there has not been an attempt to draw wisdom from the
collective scholarship.5
This Article synthesizes the collective wisdom from psychology,
sociology, anthropology, political science, and law, to derive a model that
includes the most important factors to consider in predicting how members of the
public will evaluate risks. A primary aim of this Article is to broaden and deepen
the scope of our understanding of risk perception by synthesizing various risk
4

The exception is Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, et al. The Social Amplification
of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, 8, 2 Risk Analysis 177 (1988), which is an important work, but
is subject to a number of shortcomings discussed in Section I, infra.
5
Instead, commentators have attempted to compare and contrast various methodologies and
theories in an effort to arrive at a consensus as to which of the approaches is most useful. See e.g.,
Claire Marris, Ian H. Langford, & Timothy O’Riordan, A Quantitative Test of the Cultural Theory
of Risk Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm, 18 Risk Anal., 635, 635
(1998)(finding that “The qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric paradigm
explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than cultural biases”); see
also Lennart Sjöberg , Are Received Risk Perception Models Alive and Well? 22 Risk Anal. 665
(2002) (arguing that recent scholarship touting cultural and psychometric risk analysis approaches
have been inappropriately optimistic about the approaches).
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perception theories. Ultimately, the goal is to create a single set of criteria that
can be used to understand when, and under what conditions, human beings
become concerned about particular risks. The hope is that this model will serve
as a tool for risk managers and a springboard for future normative discussion of
public risk management.6
The Article proceeds in four parts. Section I begins by describing the
current risk climate, noting the rising concern over modern risks created by
advances in science and technology. Section II explains the primary contributions
to the risk perception literature, examining each of the major theoretical
perspectives to date. Section III draws on these existing perspectives to derive a
list of the most important considerations for risk perception, and introduces
several new contributions. Section IV addresses the major considerations from
Section III, synthesizing the major work from Section II in order to provide a
comprehensive model that includes risk-amplifying and attenuating factors.7
I.

THE NATURE OF MODERN RISKS: WHY WE WORRY

Policy makers and individual Americans make risk decisions on a daily
and sometimes even minute-to-minute basis. It is impossible to think about
crime, the environment, food safety, foreign relations, medical research, consumer
protection, traffic laws, economic policy or food production without also thinking
about risk.8 So much of law and policy is driven by current wisdom regarding
potential sources of harm, that much of the time, threat containment
considerations are implicit in the debate. Risk decisions are never value neutral;
they are determined by preferences, shaped by affective reactions, and influenced
by cognitive and cultural biases, although that is not always acknowledged.
Engaging in the metacognition necessarily in order to understand human threat
responses can be uncomfortable. Arguably, this uneasiness explains why so much
of risk analysis relies on formulaic cost-benefit analysis, while avoiding
fundamental questions about how our risk responses satisfy human emotional and
intellectual requirements.
In addition to psychological obstacles, fluctuations in the risk landscape
cause challenges to risk managers and the lay public alike. The most significant
6

The Model appears in the Appendix, at the end of the Article.
The notion that risk can be amplified and attenuated was most prominently featured in the
seminal paper authored by Roger Kasperson and colleagues, entitled, The Social Amplification of
Risk: A Conceptual Framework, supra note 4.
8
See John D. Graham, Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, 102
TOXICOLOGY 29, 33-35 (1995) (explaining that carcinogens traditionally have been seen to lack
safety "thresholds," and describing how this no-threshold view prompted regulatory agencies to
adopt "individual risk" tests); See Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk
Assessment: How Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK 283, 284 (1995) ("[O]ver 300 of about 5,000
chemicals routinely used in industry have been labeled carcinogens as a result of animal studies.");
see also, Frewer, L. J., Scholderer, J., & Bredahl, L., Communicating abou the Risks and Benefits
of Genetically Modified Foods: The Mediating Role of Trust 23, 6 Risk Analysis (2003).
7
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obstacles facing human beings have changed over time as our resources and
technologies have evolved. As Paul Slovic has pointed out:
In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and nuclear
technologies has been accompanied by the potential to cause catastrophic
and long-lasting damage to the earth and the life forms that inhabit it.
The mechanisms underlying these complex technologies are unfamiliar
and incomprehensible to most citizens. Their most harmful consequences
are rare and often delayed, hence difficult to assess by statistical analysis
and not well suited to management by trial-and-error learning.9

The German sociologist Ulrich Beck notes that we have moved from a culture of
scarcity to a culture of risk.10 Today, in western societies, more people than ever
before have their basic needs met.11 Since the early 1900s, an increase in
resources devoted to researching and developing medicines, methods of food
production, and novel synthetics have dramatically increased the standard of
living for most.12 In the United States, citizens benefit tremendously from
innovative technologies, some of which not only improve the quality of life, but
also extend our lives and improve our health. However, these technologies come
with associated risks, some of which are devastating, and many of which are not
discovered until after a technology has gained general acceptance and widespread
use. The focus has shifted from concern about a lack of resources, to the
promulgation of dangers in medicines, food sources, the environment, and
consumer products.13 America, along with other western cultures, has arguably
become risk-obsessed.14 Commentators have noted the prevalence of fear in our
culture.15 Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky has famously remarked, “How
extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best protected, most resourceful
9

Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 280 (1987) (hereinafter Perception II).
Ulrich Beck, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 26 (1992).
11
See Kenneth E. Boulding, Michael Kammen, & Seymur Martin Lipset, From Abundance to
Scarcity: Implications for the American Tradition, THE HAMMOND LECT. SER. (1878)(stating that,
“the developed countries of North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia clearly consume
considerably more than half of these resources, but they have less than a quarter of the world's
population.”)
12
See Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of Growth in the late 1990’s: Is
Information Technology the Story?, 14 J. of Econ. Persp. 3, 4 (2000).
13
See Beck, supra note 9, at 19 (suggesting that the “contribution to productivity growth from the
use of information technology- including computer hardware, software, and communication
equipment- surged in the second half of the 1990s.”)
14
See David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38
Sociological Q. 647, 664 (1997)(“The perception of many is that life is very problematic,
dangerous, and demanding of extreme measures to protect us. Indeed one of the few things
Americans seem to share is the popular culture that celebrates danger and fear as entertainment
organized with canned formats delivered through an inexpensive and invasive information
technology. Private life is closer to public concerns and issues than ever before. This is because
both wear the look of popular culture. And this looks like fear.”)
15
See generally, Aaron Cohl, ARE WE SCARING OURSELVES TO DEATH?: HOW PESSIMISM,
PARANOIA, AND A MISGUIDED MEDIA ARE LEADING US TOWARD DISASTER (1997);
10
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civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its
way to becoming the most frightened.”16
If Americans seem paralyzed with fear, it may be because of the nature of
the risks we face today. Increasingly, the American populace perceives that it is
at risk from an onslaught of potential dangers that threaten health and wellbeing.17 Whereas famine, disease, and natural disasters plagued past generations
of human beings, today’s populations face increasingly diverse threats. The
development of myriad novel technologies, along with often lagging
understanding of the full complement of accompanying consequences means that
society is often fully engaged with a product or process before discovering its
risks.18 Threats to health and well-being are often difficult to detect, being
invisible to the naked eye, odorless, and tasteless, or originating in a distant
location.19 Moreover, the impact of some of the harms we face today, such as
nuclear weapons and environmental degradation, are profound and far-reaching—
to the next generation and beyond.20 Beck notes that “in the modernization
process, more and more destructive forces are being unleashed, forces before
which the human imagination stands in awe.”21 The evolution of science and
technology, and our shifting focus from production of goods to protection of
health and environment, has brought a new awareness of risk in individuals.
Individuals are more aware of risks, think more about them, engage in more selfeducation, have more opinions about them, are more emotionally and financially
invested in managing risk, and therefore desire to and ought to have an increasing
role in deciding how large-scale risk decisions are made.
Given our culture of anxiety, continuing in our current state of relative
ignorance about how members of society perceive risk will have at least two
negative consequences. First, as things stand, law and policy makers are seriously
flawed in their predictions about how members of the public will react to risks.
The result is that the public is increasingly disenchanted with government,
distrustful of industry, and scornful of politicians’ reassurances. Disillusionment
has a variety of negative consequences, ranging from apathy at the polls to civil
16

Aron Wildavsky, No risk Is the Highest Risk of All, 67 Am. Scientist 32, 32 (1979).
See PUBLIC OPINION 2 (1987). This data is clearly outdated, but more recent data suggests a
continuing trend in a similar direction.
18
See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280.
19
See Roger E. Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and Attenuation of
Risk, 545 Annals of the Am. Academy of Pol. and Soc. Science 95, 96 (1996).
The familiar scourges of famine, disease, and pestilence no longer
contaminate the risk experience, which, instead, now involved
negotiating a new and perplexing array of global threats associated with
modern armaments, chemicals and radiation often invisible to the
senses, contaminants whose effects surface only after decades or
generations, hazards created by peoples and technologies in distant part
of the globe, and harms arising from the flow and control of
information.
20
See Beck, supra note 9, at 19 (“Atomic accidents are accidents no more in the limited sense of
the word ‘accident’. They outlast generations.”) Id. (internal parenthetical omitted.)
21
Id. at 19.
17
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unrest. Moreover, distrust of the various decision-making bodies entrusted with
the safety and well-being of the citizenry results in fear, and a fearful public is
more easily manipulated and controlled by actors who use divisive and
destructive tactics. The second implication of maintaining the ignorance about
risk perception is that without input from members of the public, decisions made
for members of the public will be inevitably flawed.22 Risk calculations—such as
which benefits are outweighed by which risks—are judgment calls, and are
invariably subjective. Accordingly, decisions by a few on behalf of many,
without consideration for the preferences of those affected, is a form of tyranny.
Good governance requires inclusivity.
Some have argued that the public is ill equipped to make valid
assessments about risk because average citizens are prone to cognitive error and
bias.23 Law scholar Donald Hornstein strenuously rejects this argument as a basis
for limiting the role of the public in risk decisions. Hornstein points out that
scientists themselves are subject to inevitable uncertainties, flawed methods, and
industry bias.24 He further argues that subordination of public views to
governmental risk assessments is undemocratic. Finally, Hornstein stresses that
there is a rational basis for citizens’ risk evaluations; even where they might not
comport with statistical probabilities, they reflect legitimate personal
preferences.25
II.

CURRENT THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RISK RESPONSE

The comprehensive model of risk perception offered in this Article draws
on the major risk perception theories developed thus far.26 These theories or
methodologies include traditional risk analysis, psychometric study of risk
perception, social amplification of risk theory, availability cascade theory, and the
cultural evaluator theory. Each theoretical perspective adds an important set of
considerations, and is worthy of inclusion in the final model. The oldest and most
influential approach is traditional risk analysis. This approach is distinctly expertcentered, relies upon statistical and mathematical calculations, and involves costbenefit analysis.27 More recently, the psychometric method—an individual22

The argument that personal preferences about risk have value and must be part of the risk
decision quotient is made in substantially greater detail in Section III, infra.
23
That members of the public are prone to mistakes during decision tasks is a theme of law
scholar Cass Sunstein’s work, as manifest in the article by Kuran and Sunstein referenced below
(see note 27, supra).
24
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 610-16 (1992).
25
Id. at 610-16. This view is similar to that of Dan Kahan’s, which is detailed below. See note
102, supra and accompanying text; see also, Section II. E. supra, and accompanying text.
26
See Appendix.
27
Cost-benefit analysis can be defined as “a strategy for choice in which weightings are allocated
to the available alternatives, arriving at some kind of aggregate figure for each major option.”
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in CostBenefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives 169, 192 (Matthew D. Adler
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centered approach to risk evaluation—was pioneered by Baruch Fischhoff, Paul
Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein.28 These scholars, along with their colleagues,
solicited the opinions of ordinary Americans regarding various sources of risk,
and attempted to make generalizations about what characteristics of risk cause
people particular concern. A decade after the seminal psychometric paper, Roger
Kasperson joined with Ortwin Renn, Slovic, and several others to develop a new
model that included the dynamic processes of risk communication and
interpretation. The result, Social Amplification of Risk (SAR), predicted that
individuals would experience increasing (amplifying) or decreasing (attenuating)
concern, depending upon potential for events to trigger concern over possible
future harm. A related, but fundamentally normative explanation of risk
perception advanced by Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, explained public panics
as a result of availability cascades.29 Availability cascades, according to Kuran
and Sunstein, result when cognitively available (easily accessible) examples of an
outcome lead people to overestimate the prevalence of a risk or the likelihood of a
negative outcome. Social discourse can exacerbate this phenomenon, creating a
“snowball” effect that results in growing concern among members of the public.
Kuran and Sunstein use their theory to call for a smaller role for the public in risk
management, and to advocate for an even larger role for the expert in risk
decisions. Dan Kahan’s Cultural Evaluator Model, on the other hand, draws on
the work of Mary Douglas, who viewed emotional (ie, non-rational) reactions to
risk as manifestations of culturally shaped (and valuable) expressions of
underlying world views. Kahan, like Hornstein, advocates a greater role for
individual preferences in risk management. Each of these theoretical perspectives
is discussed in more detail below.s
A.

Traditional Risk Analysis

The most influential approach to risk management has been and remains
traditional risk analysis. This broad influence of this expert-centered, data-driven
methodology is one reason why the role of public opinion in formal risk
management has been marginalized. Traditional risk analysis (also referred to as
“risk management”) can be defined as “the identification, assessment, and
prioritization followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to
minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). See also, Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition,
Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1153, 1153 (2000)(“The term
‘cost-benefit analysis’ has a variety of meanings and uses. At the highest level of generality, it is
virtually synonymous with welfare economics, that is, economics used normatively—used, that is,
to provide guidance for the formation of policy, either public (the more common domain of the
term) or private.”)(internal citation omitted).
28
See Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A
Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits 9 Pol. Sci. 127, 128
(1978).
29
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683,703 (1999).
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events.”30 Traditional risk analysis has been used widely, and applied to gauge
risk in the areas of business enterprise, systems management; insurance; health
epidemics; and military operations, to name a few. Depending upon the project or
set of circumstances, the goals may vary somewhat, although the method tends to
be consistent.31 Within this methodology, attempts have been made to create
universal, international standards by which risk can be assessed and managed.32
Traditional risk analysis has been conceived of as a method for determining an
appropriate response on a large-scale to wide-spread or catastrophic risk33
Traditional risk analysis has relied on a purportedly value-neutral formula:
[probability of risk occurring] x [cost associated with that risk event].34 The
formula-based approach focuses largely on hazards related to new technologies,
environmental degradation, and public health.35 It was, and still is, “distinctly
‘expert-centered’ and uncomfortable with (or even hostile to) considering the
views of diverse, nonexpert parties.”36 Risks are defined as the chance of
physical harm (to person, property, or element of the natural world) due to
technologies, diseases or other mechanisms.37 This definition excludes explicit
consideration of affect or value-based reactions to risk.
Traditional risk analysis is not without its critics. Some of the criticism
has focused on the method’s overreliance on basic methods and formulas that lack
predictive power.38 However, there is a more fundamental issue, relating to the
30

See generally, Douglas Hubbard, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT'S BROKEN AND
HOW TO FIX IT (2009).
31
The methodology involves the following steps: (1) identify, characterize, and assess threats; (2)
assess the vulnerability of critical assets (3) determine the consequences (i.e., the risk); (4) identify
ways to reduce those risks; and (5) prioritize risk reduction measures based on a strategy. See,
Committee Draft of ISO 31000 Risk Management, International Organization for Standardization
(2009)(on file with author).
32
For example, the International Organization for Standardization has codified a family of
standards relating to risk called ISO 31000. The purpose of ISO 31000:2009 is to provide
principles and generic guidelines on risk management. Id.
33
See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 14 (2004)
(advocating the use of cost-benefit analysis by regulators when shaping responses to catastrophic
risk).
34
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 2. The formula parallels one side of the
well-know Coase Theorem, expressed as B < PL, and famously cited by Judge Learned Hand of
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in his decision, United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d
169 (2d. Cir. 1947). The Coase Theorem represents an efficiency equation, where B is the burden
of prevention, P is the probability of loss, and L is the cost of the loss. Optimal efficiency is
reached when prevention is taken only if the cost of prevention is less than PL. Importantly, this
formula works when the losses are pecuniary. Important ethical considerations arise when the
losses involve human life or health. Id.
35
See Gary E. Machlis & Eugene A Rosa, Desired Risk: Broadening the Social Amplification of
Risk Framework, 10 Risk Anal. 161, 161 (1989) (arguing that one important—but oft neglected—
aspect of risk behavior is that of risks that are freely assumed).
36
See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex. Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment
Battlefied, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 59, 59 (1997)
37
See Beck, supra note 9, at 4 (from Scott Lash & Brian Wynne, Introduction).
38
See e.g., Douglas Hubbard, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT'S BROKEN AND HOW
TO FIX IT 46 (2009).
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inputs; traditional risk analysis gives little or no consideration to the human
element; it either ignores or substantially underemphasizes public sentiment
regarding potential threats.39
This feature of risk analysis means that
policymakers are (1) unable to predict how members of society will view specific
dangers as the threats become salient to the public (2) ill equipped to craft
responses to risk that take into account public fear of these hazards.40 In other
words, as Kasperson, Renn, and Slovic have noted, “the technical concept of risk
is too narrow and ambiguous to serve as the crucial yardstick for policy
making.”41 Beck similarly worries that “as long as the debate is “conducted
exclusively or dominantly in the terms and formulas of natural science” the
danger exists that the “terms will inadvertently include human beings in the
picture only as organic material . . . it runs the risk of atrophying into a discussion
of nature without people, without asking about matters of social and cultural
significance.”42
Another layer of complexity in this discussion stems from the fact that
harms often accompany technologies, processes, or products that have important
benefits. The value placed on these benefits can fluctuate, so that even if the
evaluation of associated benefits and harms stays constant, tolerance for the risk
may change.
Particularly as novel technologies develop, making other
technologies obsolete, this balance of benefit and harm is ever evolving. This
aspect of modern risk analysis is another reason why some have argued that the
relative risk of various technologies is not appropriately determined exclusively
by risk experts, who may not have a clear sense for the current value of a
particular technology to the public at large.43
B.
39

Psychometric Study of Risk Perception

See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 177.
Proposed characteristics of effective risk management have attempted to account for the
human element, but only in a reactive, rather than a responsive and interactive fashion.
(1) Risk management should create value.
(2) Risk management should be an integral part of organizational processes.
(3) Risk management should be part of decision making.
(4) Risk management should explicitly address uncertainty.
(5) Risk management should be systematic and structured.
(6) Risk management should be based on the best available information.
(7) Risk management should be tailored.
(8) Risk management should take into account human factors.
(9) Risk management should be transparent and inclusive.
(10) Risk management should be dynamic, iterative and responsive to change.
(11) Risk management should be capable of continual improvement and enhancement.
See Committee Draft of ISO, supra note 30.
41
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 at 178.
42
Beck, supra note 9, at 24. Although some cost-benefit risk analysts who have traditionally
focused on economic issues have started to raise relevant questions about risk perception and
preferences, they have done little to answer these questions. See Ian Savage, An Empirical
Investigation into the Effects of Psychological Perceptions on the Wiling-to-Pay to Reduce Risk, 6
J. of Risk and Uncertainty 75, 76 (1993).
43
See Section I. E., infra (for a discussion of the cultural evaluator theory of risk perception).
40
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The psychometric study of risk was a response to the predominant method
employed by traditional risk analysis, known as risk-benefit analysis, which is
based upon cost-benefit analysis, but is specific to risk management. Risk-benefit
is a method of analysis that asks “Is this product (activity, technology) acceptably
safe? Alternatively, how safe is safe enough?”44 Baruch Fischhoff along with
Paul Slovic and colleagues believed that the risk-benefit analysis was inadequate
for answering those questions.45 Specifically, they took issue with the "revealed
preference" theory of risk-benefit analysis, which assumes that through trial and
error, society has determined an optimum level of risk for a given activity.46 The
primary criticism of psychometric analysis is that it ignores the fact that society’s
preferences fluctuate. 47 “Revealed preferences” also assumes that the market
correctly reflects optimal risk level and it discounts the possibility that the public
is accepting a risk because it is ignorant of the potential for harm or the potential
for elimination of harm.48
In response to the perceived weaknesses of this method of risk analysis,
Fischoff
and colleagues proposed a surprisingly little-used method of
ascertaining the “acceptability” of risk— they asked people questions.49 The goal
was to derive a “cognitive map”50 or a taxonomy for hazards that could serve as a
tool for understanding and predicting risk responses.51 Psychometric researchers
hoped to explain “people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to
others, and the discrepancies between these reactions and opinions of experts.”52
The initial method and the results were presented in a 1978 empirical paper.
Although the methodology was not without drawbacks,53 the work represented a
breakthrough in risk analysis, turning focus toward the perceptions and priorities
of members of the public, rather than focusing exclusively on formulas or experts
to determine acceptable risks and risk levels.
C. The Social Amplification of Risk Theory
If the psychometric study of risk perception was a breakthrough, the
“social amplification of risk” theory advanced the field further, building on the
previous work by adding social, cultural, and other dynamic aspects of risk
perception to the equation. 54 In 1988, Roger Kasperson and his colleagues
44

See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 27.
The work with which Fischhoff, Slovic, and colleagues took issue is Chauncey Starr Social
Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165, Science, 1232 (1969).
46
Id..
47
See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, et al. supra note 27, at 129.
48
See id. at 128.
49
See id. at 127.
50
See Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2, at 222.
51
See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8, at 287.
52
Id.
53
For example, the respondents were all women, and were all members of the League of Women
voters. For a variety of reasons, this group is not likely to be representative of society as a whole.
54
See generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4.
45
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introduced the novel framework, which sought to describe active and interactive
forces through which risk perceptions are amplified and attenuated.55 Social
amplification of risk (SAR) included additional influences not accounted for by
traditional risk analysis. Like the psychometric model, SAR accounts for
characteristics of a hazard that influence the public’s response to risk, including
whether the risk is assumed voluntarily, familiarity with the source of the danger,
and the potential for catastrophe.56 In addition, SAR includes consideration of
cultural factors, such as those affecting the priorities and agendas of various
societal subgroups, the associated efforts to influence risk responses, and social
aspects, such as the impacts of information communication.57 Hence, SAR is
concerned with more than cost-benefit analysis or individual preference; this
theory includes factors that implicate ethical and normative considerations.
The SAR concept envisions a flexible feedback system in which social
perceptions of risks influence behaviors which then impact responses to risk,
which in turn influence the public’s view of the risk.58 In addition to the more
comprehensive framework provided by SAR, the theory makes several
particularly valuable contributions to the field of risk analysis. In short, SAR
posits that “risk events interact with psychological, social, and cultural processes
in ways that can heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related risk
behavior . . . [and that] behavioral patterns in turn generate secondary social or
economic consequences . . . [and] may act also to increase or decrease the physical
risk itself.”59
1. Amplification Mechanisms
SAR identifies “amplification stations” and steps whereby, either through
direct experience, or more commonly, by learning from other sources, individuals
develop heightened sensitivity to various risks.60 Kasperson et al. describe this
process at several levels. At the message level, SAR parses the communication
into factual information, inferential messages, and conclusions, the formation of
which depend upon which cultural symbols and values are implicated.61 In
addition to the content of the message, the number of times the message is
55

Id.
Id. See Machlis & Rosa, supra note 22, at 164.
57
.See generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4; See also, Arie Rip, Should Social
Amplification of Risk be Counteracted? 8,2 Risk Analysis 193, 196 (1988).
58
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178 The authors admit that other scholars have
written in a less comprehensive fashion about the dynamic social aspect of risk analysis. See B.
Wynne, Public Perceptions of Risk, in Surrey, J. (ed.) 246-259 THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION OF
IRRADIATED FUEL (1984); see also generally, B. Johnson & V. Covello, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RISK (1987).
59
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 at 178. See also, Nick Pidgeon, Risk
Communication and the Social Amplification of Risk : Theory, Evidence,and Policy Implications,
4 Risk Decision and Policy 145, 146 (1999);
60
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 184; See also, Pidgeon, supra note 59, at
147 (1999);
61
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 180.
56
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repeated may affect judgments about accuracy.62 At the signal level, scientists,
the media, political organizers, public agencies, and other interested individuals
and groups generate and communicate information about the potential for harm.63
Recipients of the information filter and decode the signals they receive and
ultimately interpret and often communicate that information to others, forming
conclusions in the process.64
2. Secondary and Third-order Impacts
Once recipients have interpreted the information, bringing personal
experience and value judgments to bear in the process, they manifest behavioral
responses. These responses can involve attempts to change the status quo,
including pressuring policy makers; altering personal behavioral patterns;
communicating attitudes to others in the community; and engaging in related
consumer behavior.65 These behavioral responses result in secondary impacts,
which according to Kasperson and colleagues include impacts on business sales,
modifications in training of emergency personnel, protesting or other forms of
social unrest, changes in regulatory standards, and political and social pressure.66
3. Information Channels
In addition to describing outcomes, social amplification theory also seeks to
explain the characteristics of information flow, and how patterns of social
exchange and the very nature of communication can impact perceptions of risk.
SAR identifies four aspects of communication about risk that can affect risk
judgments: the volume of information about the risk, the degree to which the
information is controversial, the sensationalistic nature of the information, and the
“symbolic connotations” inherent in the information.67 Several of these
characteristics implicate certain previously discussed so-called amplification
stations. For example, the media’s interest in a particular risk is likely to result in
repeated, highly sensationalized reports, increasing the public’s attention to the
risk.68
Social amplification theory is primarily focused on risk amplification, but the
theory does provide some insight into factors that will tend to result in risk

62

Id. See also, See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. See also, Pidgeon, supra note
59, at 147 (1999);
63
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 181.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 , at 182; See also, Pidgeon, supra note 59, at
147(explaining that some events will lead to spreading “ripples” of secondary consequences which
go beyond the initial impact of the event); See also, Machlis & Rosa, supra note 22, at 163.
67
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4 at 184.
68
See id. (pointing out that repeated coverage of a particular hazard can result in public “scares”).
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attenuation.69 One example is an individual’s direct, personal experience with a
particular risk. Although direct experience can serve to amplify risk judgments,
such as when a hazard leaves an indelible memory because of its vivid nature,
amplification is not the only possible result of direct experience.70 Familiarity
with a risky activity can sometimes result in statistically low risk calculations, as
is the case when drivers are asked the likelihood of serious injury or death
resulting from the operation of an automobile.71
4. Features of the Social Environment
Finally, recipients of information about risks have characteristics that help to
determine how the information will be received and processed. For example,
human beings are limited in their ability to process information. As a result, they
rely on cognitive rules of thumb, or heuristics, when they process information.72
Although the use of heuristics is often helpful, it can also result in misleading or
biased judgments.73 Cultural values, like heuristics, shape the lens through which
information is evaluated and assimilated, helping to determine which dangers are
given high priority.74 Timing becomes important when the political landscape
encourages posturing around real or perceived dangers to public welfare. When
subgroups within society hold opposing views on issues, SAR theory predicts that
“a risk . . . will be vigorously brought to more general public attention . . . [and
p]olarization of views and escalation of rhetoric by partisans typically occur and
new recruits are drawn into the conflict.”75 Kasperson et al. also claim that the
“signal” sent by a risk event and the “stigma” associated with certain locations or
processes can influence risk perception.76

69

William J. Burns, Paul Slovic, Roger E. Kasperson, Jeanne X. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, &
Srinivas Emani, Incorporating Structural Models into Research on the Social Amplification of
Risk: Implications for Theory Construction and Decision Making 13, 6 Risk Analysis 611
(1993)(developing structural models to explain how the impact upon society of an accident is
influenced by several factors including the physical consequences of the event, perceived risk,
media coverage, and public response).
70
See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18 at 96.
71
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 184 (“Generally, experience with dramatic
accidents or risk events increases the memorability and imaginability of the hazard, thereby
heightening the perception of risk. But direct experience can also . . . afford . . . better perspective
and enhanced capacity for avoiding risks.” Id.
72
Heuristics and biases are discussed in greater detail in Section II, infra.
73
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982)).
74
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185. An example of just such a value is the
notion that society’s children, because they are uniquely vulnerable members of society and
because they are the “future” or our civilization, are worthy of special protection. This sentiment
would result in a higher level of concern over risks that could negatively impact young members
of society.
75
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 185.
76
The inclusion of “signal value” and “stigmatization”, while helpful and relevant to predicting
and understanding public reactions to risk, do not fit particularly well under the rubric of social
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This type of polarization and galvanization around an issue or event is a
typical phenomenon in politics, and particularly in our two-party system.
Discontent over the state of the economy, financial markets, the housing market,
and unemployment generally, caused deep divisions following a series of events
occurring between 2007 and 2010. The precipitous fall of the housing market,
starting in 2006,77 proved disastrous for countless Americans, many of whom lost
their jobs and ultimately their homes in the ensuing financial meltdown.78
According to the social amplification of risk theory, the economic downturn
served as a signal, shaping how Americans viewed subsequent events.
Subsequent events, such as the government bailout of struggling financial
institutions, the implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program79 (signed
into law by U.S. President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008), the election of
Barack Obama to the presidency one month later, and Obama’s subsequent push
for healthcare reform were evaluated in terms of the on-going crisis, fueling the
anxiety of those already apprehensive about threats to their financial security.
With fear as a powerful catalyst, citizens became increasingly nervous and
divided. As noted by the Pew Research Center in April, 2010, “(b)y almost every
conceivable measure Americans are less positive and more critical of government
these days. The Pew survey concluded that “a perfect storm of conditions
associated with distrust of government—a dismal economy, an unhappy public,
and bitter partisan-based backlash—resulted in epic discontent with Congress and
elected officials.”80
D.

Availability Cascade Theory

What explains widespread fixations on unthreatening waste dumps,
nearly harmless chemicals, and unlikely causes of a tragic airplane crash,
when for years on end far more serious health hazards, such as breast
cancer, indoor air pollution, “junk food” consumption, and asthma in the
inner city have commanded comparatively little attention?81
environmental factors. Ambiguity in how to categorize various SAR factors is one drawback of
the theory.
77
According to one report: “A variety of experts now say, the housing industry appears to be
moving from a boom to something that is starting to look a lot like a bust.” Jeremy W. Peters,
Sales Slow for Homes New and Old. N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, found at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/business/26home.html?_r=1&oref=login&ref=business&pag
ewanted=print (last visited, Aug. 27, 2010).
78
See, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression
REUTERS,
February
29,
2009,
found
at,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227
(last
visited, Aug. 28, 2010).
79
For more on TARP, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm (last visited,
Aug. 27, 2010).
80
Press Release, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, The People and Their
Government: Distrust, Discontent, Anger, and Partisan Rancor (April 18, 2010)
(found at: http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf, last visited, Aug. 24, 2010).
81
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28 at 703.
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This is the question Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein posed more than a
decade after Kasperson et al. published their initial paper on social amplification
of risk. The answer, according to Kuran and Sunstein is availability cascades.82
Kuran and Sunstein based their notion of availability cascades on the work of
Kahneman and Tversky, who described the availability heuristic twenty-five years
earlier.83 The availability heuristic was described by Kahenman and Tversky as
operating in “situations in which people assess the frequency of a class or the
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be
brought to mind. This judgmental heuristic is called availability.”84 The
availability heuristic has gained traction in legal scholarship, and is defined as a
widely-used mental shortcut that leads people to assign a higher likelihood to
events that are readily “available,” which is to say those that are particularly likely
to come to mind due to their vividness, recency, or frequency.85

82

Although the first published paper containing an extensive discussion of availability cascades
was Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28), several other
law review articles referenced the concept in 1998, citing to the Kuran & Sunstein paper as a work
in progress: see e.g., Cass. R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175
(1997); see also, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler , A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); see also, Cass R. Sunstein, How Law
Constructs Preferences, 86 Geo. L.J. (1998).
83
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Science 1124, 1127 (1974) (introducing “availability” along with other heuristics and biases).
See also, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). For some early law review pieces discussing heuristical
processing and responses in legal frameworks, see Mark G. Kelman et al., Imperfect Information
in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1436-42 (1983) (discussing the availability and representative heuristics); Barbara D.
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L. J. 1408 (1979) (“Studies show that in making
individualized judgments people rely primarily on information about the case at hand, paying
relatively little attention to background information about other cases.”).
84
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note at 83, at 1127.
85
I will have a great deal more to say about the availability heuristic at a later point in this Article.
The characteristics (frequency, recency, and vividness) that have been demonstrated to increase
cognitive availability (or make specific examples more memorable) have important implications
for determining when risk communication is likely. The availability heuristic therefore becomes
central in formulating a predictive model of risk communication and perception. For more on the
availability heuristic, see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 683-91;Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler,
supra note 82 at 1519; see also, Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational
Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 270-71 (Francesco Parisi &
Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); see also, Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1091 (2000); see also, Justin Pidot, The Applicability of Nuisance Law to Invasive
Plants: Can Common Law Liability Inspire Government Action?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 22223 (2005); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and
Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005)[hereinafter, Sunstein,
Precautions].
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The primary claim of Kuran and Sunstein is that in certain instances, the
availability heuristic is perpetuated and enlarged by certain social mechanisms
that serve to reinforce widespread, erroneous risk judgments.86 Availability
cascades occur when information about potential harms travels through social
communication channels, and a prevailing wisdom is created and reinforced.87
The process occurs when “expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual
responses that make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their
rising availability in public discourse.”88 The motivations behind these cascades
may be information or reputational.89 A reputational cascade occurs when
individuals espouse views because doing so carries with it some sort of social
advantage.90 In the case of a reputational cascade, the prevailing wisdom is
accepted and perpetuated independent of, and sometimes in spite of, a society
member’s actual worldview.91 An informational cascade, in contrast, is based
upon the genuine acceptance that beliefs that are espoused by a significant
segment of society must be correct. 92 The informational cascade is therefore
driven by individuals’ search for data about their world.93
In their search for truth and their efforts to maintain a positive reputation,
individuals perpetuate beliefs that come to them through various communication
channels by adopting those beliefs and communicating them to other members of

86

See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685.
. See Sunstein, Precautions, supra note 68, at 77.
88
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685; See also, Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P.
Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability
Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 102, 111 (2009) (discussing the “trigger phase” in their
model of the availability campaign).
89
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 686. The concept of informational and reputational
motivations is related to the similar concepts of injunctive norms (norms of which most others
approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (that which most others do). (Kuran and Sunstein
point out that there may be overlap between these two types of cascades, and that this overlap
occurs when individuals affected by these cascades have dual underlying motivations: obtaining
information and gaining social approval). See also generally, Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R.
Reno & Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of
Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1015, 1023 (1990).
90
See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27
J. Legal Stud. 623, 623 (1998) (“. . .a reputational cascade [is]a self-reinforcing process by which
people motivated to protect and enhance their reputations . . .”).
91
Id.
92
See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom,
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 992 (1992) (discussing the
utilitarian nature of informational cascades); see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 686; see
also, Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and
Informational Cascades, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 151 (1998).
93
For a discussion of how informational cascades can exacerbate risk aversion in a medical
setting, see James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1641,
1670 (2008)(“ . . . medicine is subject to informational cascades: the more physicians that adopt a
new procedure, the greater the chance that other physicians will discount any individual
misgivings and follow the herd.” ); see also generally, Bikhchandani et al., supra note 75 (for a
more general discussion of herd behavior).
87
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society.94 Availability cascades are reinforced and expanded in this fashion. This
process might not be problematic, according to Kuran and Sunstein, if it were not
for the fact that the information about risk that travels like “wildfire”95 through
social discourse is often incorrect or misleading. Socially communicated risk
information contains inflated estimates of risk and causes “public panics.” Kuran
and Sunstein are careful to qualify their claim; they stop short of characterizing as
maladaptive human tendencies to seek information through social channels. They
acknowledge that social networks are valuable sources for information about
potential harms.96 According to Kuran and Sunstein, the inefficiency occurs not
because people look to others for information to form the basis for beliefs, but
because communication cascades can help to create and can reinforce availability
effects, which in turn, can lead to widespread misperceptions.97
Although the primary article was coauthored by Kuran and Sunstein,
Sunstein has written a series of article and essays–several of which serve as the
foundation for Sunstein’s book Laws of Fear— that elaborate on the initial
availability campaign paper. Sunstein’s goal in this body of work is primarily
normative. He argues that an effective government should be deliberative, rather
than simply reactive. He makes the case that public panics can influence policy,
resulting in inefficient and potentially harmful legislation. 98 Sunstein also takes
issue with the precautionary principle, namely the notion that when a potential
94

Sunstein, Precautions, supra note 68, at 96; See also, Recent Case, Immigration Law –
Administrative Adjudication – Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in
Immigration Courts –Wang v. Attorney, 423 F. 3D 260 (3D CIR. 2005), and Benslimane v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3D 828, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2601 (2006) (explaining that politicians and
the media repeat salient examples in a self-reinforcing availability cascade).
95
This notion that information about fear travels like wildfire through society is the subject of a
chapter in Sunstein’s book, LAWS OF FEAR entitled “Fear as Wildfire.” Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS
OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).[hereinafter Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR]
96
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685 (“There is nothing irrational about participating in
an informational cascade. Often people have little information about the magnitude of a risk or the
seriousness of an alleged social problem. They stand to gain from tuning into, and letting
themselves be guided by, the signals of others.”)
97
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 11-14 (in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic
& Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (describing how the availability heuristic can lead to errors in
reasoning and decision-making); see also Kuran & Sunstein supra note 64, at 688 (acknowledging
that availability campaigns can spark useful debate on neglected issues, but maintaining that
“availability campaigns sometimes do great harm by producing widespread availability errors”);
see also, Kuran & Sunstein supra note 64, at 685 (“Under certain circumstances…[availability
cascades] generate persistent social availability errors – widespread mistaken beliefs grounded in
interactions between the availability heuristic and the social mechanisms we describe. The
resulting mass delusions may last indefinitely, and they may produce wasteful or even detrimental
laws and policies.”) (internal citations omitted).
98
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1067 (2000)
(hereinafter Sunstein, Cognition)(noting that cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic
can produce a public demand for regulation even though the relevant risks are trivial, while
producing little or no demand for regulation of risks that are large in magnitude); see Sunstein,
Precautions, supra note 68, at 98 (noting that cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic
can produce a public demand for regulation regardless of the actual risk).

CULTURE & RISK

19

risk is identified, steps should be taken to guard against the risk, even where
scientific consensus is lacking. A primary claim of Sunstein’s body of work on
risk response is that the tendency to take precautions against publicly perceived
threats often imposes more costs than taking no action at all.
E.

The Cultural Evaluator Model and the Role of Emotion

The rationale for omitting the public from risk policy decisions—as seen
in the work of Kuran and Sunstein as well as in traditional risk management—is
the notion that members of the public are irrationally influenced by their
emotional reactions.99 The cultural view of risk perception questions this
assumption. Recent scholars interested in cultural antecedents of risk response
question the notion that “facts” ascertained by experts should serve as the
exclusive basis for sound risk policy. 100 Instead, they argue that “facts cannot be
separated from values in policy-related science contexts.”101 Put differently, risk
judgments are socially constructed, and do not exist as independent “truths” to be
discovered.102 For the proponent of a cultural model, affective (emotional)
responses to risk are expressions of socially and culturally derived values.103 As
such, these affective responses gain legitimacy in the risk policy discussion.
Legal scholar Dan Kahan writes, “When people draw on their emotions to judge
the risk that such an activity poses, they form an expressively rational attitude
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Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2, at 59.“[Public risk judgments] are seen as irrational by many
harsh critics of public perceptions. These critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the experts and
the public. Experts are seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as objective, analytic,
wise, and rational--based on the real risks. In contrast, the public is seen to rely on perceptions of
risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational; see also, Kuran &
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 683 (Supporting the notion that emotions can cause irrational decisionmaking is the dual system concept of reasoning. System 1 reasoning is “fast, automatic, effortless,
associative, and often emotionally charged.” (Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449, 1451 (2003)) On the other hand,
System 2 reasoning is slow and deliberate, and more likely to include consideration of
probabilities and careful weighing of costs and benefits. Implications of this view is that System 1
is necessary in situations where there is a lack of information and resources, but that it is more
likely to result in error than System 2. Kahan’s claim, see Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (2008); Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra
note 4, at 181.See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 128; Beck, supra note 9, at
24.
100
And yet, “[a]ssessment procedures derived from the public health, toxicity, and engineering
studies that have dominated the management programs of governments and corporations
illuminate one portion of the risk complex while concealing others.” Kasperson & Kasperson,
supra note 18, at 96; See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 (arguing for the importance of the
public’s role in risk assessment).
101
Judith A. Bradbury, The Policy Implications of Differing Concepts of Risk 14 Sci., Tech. &
Hum. Values, 380, 399 (1989).
102
See id, at 381-82.(arguing that “factual” empirical evidence alone does not lead to any useful
conclusions).
103
See generally, Kahan, supra note 99.
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about what it would mean for their cultural worldviews for society to credit the
claim that that activity is dangerous and worthy of regulation.”104
Cultural theory is sometimes discussed with reference to cultural “biases,”
or patterns of social relationships and cultural understandings that result in
particular worldviews.105 A central feature of the theory is the notion that
culturally derived values have legitimate influences over risk preferences.106 The
membership of an individual in a certain class—hierarchical, egalitarian,
individualistic, and fatalistic—is believed to help gauge that individual’s risk
tolerance and preferences.107 Importantly, because all human beings are cultural
evaluators, no one individual can act as an unbiased “expert” free from cultural
influences on risk evaluations. Hence, to allow certain individuals to serve as
“experts” with unique power to formulate risk responses is to privilege the
cultural understandings of a few members of society at the expense of the cultural
understandings of the rest of society.108 Anthropologist Mary Douglas has argued
that purportedly value-neutral scientists and policy analysts commonly foist their
own values on the public. Douglas claimed that “[the risk researcher’s] method
assumes that all humans have the same responses and preferences that are
enshrined in the utilitarian philosophy. Instead of objectivity, we find ideological
entrenchment.” 109 The often wholesale substitution of experts’ opinions for
those of the public is particularly problematic when one considers data from
studies suggesting that the public and experts hold divergent views about risks.110
Another critical aspect of the cultural evaluator model is the belief that individuals
may have deeply personal reasons for choosing certain risks over others.111
Accordingly, a uniform approach to any particular source of risk should therefore
be undertaken with the understanding that it may subvert the values of some
members of society.
104

Id.
The term “bias” is a bit of a misnomer, given that bias tends to have consistently negative
connotations. “Cultural tendencies” is probably more reflective of the nature of these underlying
predilections.
106
Marris, Langford, O’Riordan, supra note 4, at 636.
107
Thompson and colleagues have discussed the variables as follows: “Group refers to the extent
to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units. The greater the incorporation, the more
individual choice is subject to group determination. Grid denotes the degree to which an
individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. See Richard Ellis, Michael
Thompson & Aron Wildavsky, CULTURAL THEORY 5 (1990).
108
See Ellis, Thompson, Wildavsky, id. at 5; see generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28; see
also, Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 95, at 126, for examples of works that propose
substituting public risk decisions with those of unbiased experts.
109
As Douglas writes, “When he brackets off culture from his work, the well-intentioned risk
analyst has tied his own hands. He wants to be free of bias, he would rather pretend that bias is
not important than sully himself by trying to categorize some kinds of bias. . . .” Mary Douglas,
RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 13 (1992). See also, Mary Douglas & Aaron
Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers
(1982).
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See James Flynn & Paul Slovic, Expert and Public Evaluations of Technological Risks: Search
for Common Ground 10 Risk: Health Safety & Env't 333 (1999).
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The availability cascade and cultural evaluator theories offer opposing
normative claims in the area of risk policy and response. Accordingly, Sunstein
and Kahan have particular prescriptive agendas for risk managers and law makers.
Rather than debating the merits of each claim in order to declare a victor, the
current discussion extracts the elements underlying the predictive arguments.
After distilling the data that serves as the basis for the normative arguments, the
relevant information is incorporated into the model.
F.
1.

Why A Comprehensive Model Is Necessary

Limitations of Existing Theories

While each of the above methods of risk analysis lends something
important to the discussion, none of the theories I have discussed provides a
comprehensive framework to guide risk policy decisions. Moreover, the theories
are distinct; they do not build on one another, nor do they consistently learn from
one another.112 Hence, each is necessarily incomplete. In addition, each of the
theories and methods has specific drawbacks. This Article synthesizes the various
theoretical perspectives to arrive at a complete model of public risk perception.113
The model represents a vital step toward a new understanding of how individuals
assess and respond to potential threats. It is designed to provide insight to risk
managers and policy-makers in the course of decision-making. The model should
also serve as a basis for further conversation and healthy debate about the role of
the citizenry and experts in risk management.
Psychometric studies of risk perception are useful to the extent that they
get a detailed picture of those risks reported by people to be most worrisome.
However, this method suffers from the fact that it asks questions about risk in a
socially static context.114 Surveys about risk capture a snapshot of the risk
judgments of a number of people, without providing a good understanding of the
degree to which those judgments are individual or a source of social
understandings. At any given time, the risk perception of an individual might be
influenced by information and evaluations of one or more other individuals.
None of the social dynamic is explicitly captured or explained by psychometric
studies of risk perception.115 Moreover, asking respondents in a laboratory setting
about their attitudes regarding various types of hazards sacrifices external
validity; in other words, responses elicited in this fashion may not be genuine.116
An experimental setting is not necessarily representative of what occurs out there
112

The exception is SAR, which takes into account psychometric risk analysis.
See Appendix.
114
See Sjöberg, Policy Implications, supra note 5, at 15.
115
There are other criticisms of this method as well. One is that the data derived is based upon
self reporting, which is a problematic method of gathering data because people are not always
accurate or forthright about their own attitudes or behaviors.
116
See generally, Bradbury, supra note 84, at 383-84 (suggesting that psychometric studies
provide a subjectivist interpretation within an artifical paradigm that may provide unreliable
results).
113
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by the water cooler, on the neighborhood sidewalk, or at dinner parties. Here
there is a complex meeting of social, cultural, communication, and human
elements.
Social Amplification of Risk attempts to correct the primary failing of
psychometric studies by incorporating an understanding of the social dynamic
involved in risk response. However, while SAR is an impressive attempt to
derive a comprehensive model, the model accounts only for some of the
empirically supported antecedents of risk perception.117 Moreover, although it is
true that, as the SAR authors claim, “risk analysis . . . requires an approach that is
capable of illuminating risk in its full complexity, is sensitive to the social settings
in which risk occurs, and also recognizes that social interactions may either
amplify or attenuate the signals to society about the risk,”118 the model is
exceedingly complex. The SAR model is arguably too elaborate to be useable
and testable.
Kuran and Sunstein’s work on the availability cascade is based upon the
availability heuristic, a feature of human cognition that is well documented from
an empirical standpoint. Although the theory is compelling, its foundation is a
normative claim, and its “proof” is historical anecdote. Because it is backwardlooking, it lacks predictive power. Moreover, Kuran and Sunstein’s normative
claim is subject to criticism on several fronts. 119First, it assumes that risks
possessing certain features are worthy of attention and resource expenditure,
while others are not.120 Second, it also recommends handing over the decision
making to “experts,” an approach that is increasingly questioned.121 As Beck has
noted, “There is no expert on risk . . . [w]here and how does one draw the line
between still acceptable and no longer acceptable exposures?”122 Third,
unchecked deference to risk experts also undervalues the potential benefits
stemming from social pressure for change.123 Fourth, it assumes a unidirectional
effect of social cascades. As Arie Rip points out “the focus as well as the concern
is about intensification and the additional social costs accompanying
‘exaggerated’ responses . . . while there is no (equivalent discussion or examples)
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Pidgeon, supra note 59, at 147.
Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18 at 96. See also, Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71.
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Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 685 (“Under certain cirucumstances…[availability
cascades] generate persistent social availability errors – widespread mistaken beliefs grounded in
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laws and policies”)(internal citations omitted)
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It claims to possess a wisdom that trumps the prevailing wisdom of the time. See Molly J.
Walker Wilson, Adaptive Responses to Risk and the Irrationally Emotional Public, 54 St. Louis
L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2010). See also generally, Douglas, note .
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See Sjöberg, Policy Implications, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that experts give considerably
lower risk estimates than the public whenever they rate risks that fall within their own field of
expertise and responsibility).
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Beck, supra note 9 at 29 (emphasis omitted).
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See also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71.
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of the social costs of attenuation of risk.”124 And finally, the theory is of limited
practical use in predicting public responses to potential sources of danger, because
it lacks a comprehensive theory to predict specific factors and environments that
contribute to public risk perception.125
2.

What We Stand to Gain from a Comprehensive Model

In addition to the limitations explained above, because each of the
theoretical perspectives addresses a different focus, none of them provides a
complete picture of how members of the public view different types of risks in the
diverse social and cultural circumstances that can influence and shape
perceptions. A model that draws on the best of each body of work gains a
richness that any one approach standing alone lacks. This model also— because
it is self-consciously focused on public perception—supplies law makers and
experts what they have been lacking, the ability to include the individual lay
perspective in the decision-making equation.126
Inclusion of the public in the decision-making process will result in a more
discursive, thoughtful process of decision-making in the face of some of the most
serious threats.127 Because understanding of public risk perception is so limited,
law and policy makers currently lack the ability to incorporate public attitudes
prior to taking a course of action. Instead, they must wait for the public’s reaction
after the fact, and then the feedback is often limited to situations in which the
outcome is sufficiently disastrous to generate public outrage. The advantages of
having a model that could help determine risk preferences of members of the
public in advance cannot be overstated. 128
III.
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Rip questions the assumption that social amplification is necessarily problematic, as his title
illustrates: Should Social Amplification of Risk Be Counteracted? 8, 2 Risk Analysis 193 (1988).
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In advancing his claims, Sunstein draws on the theories of Fischhoff, Slovic, Beck, Kasperson,
all of which are also discussed in this Article.
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See Appendix.
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See Dana, supra note 201 at 1328 (arguing that decision-makers are more likely to consider
carefully the consequences of various risks when the public is involved in the conversation).
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Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (2006)(“the public welfare of
democratic societies depends on their capacity to abate all manner of natural and man-made
hazards…”); see Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, Why Study Risk Perception?, 2
RISK ANALYSIS 83, 83 (1982) ( the question “how safe is safe enough?” appears to be [a] major
policy issue); see also, Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al.,
supra note 31, at 127-52.(Citizens of modern industrial societies are presently learning a harsh and
discomforting lesson-that the benefits from technology must be paid for not only with money, but
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Scholars who have studied risk perception have generally focused on one
of several methodologies. One line of research has applied broad findings from
behavioral decision-making to risk perceptions.129 Another approach involves
identifying which characteristics of hazards particularly likely to trigger fear or
concern in an attempt to derive a “cognitive map” of risk perception from that
data.130 Another focus of research emphasizes the social component of risk
perception, examining the dynamic nature of risk communication as information
travels through public discourse.131 Yet another line of work focuses on the
impact of cultural or sub-cultural factors on beliefs about risks.132 Each
theoretical approach has provided a different emphasis; each has yielded valuable
insights, and yet none is sufficient on its own. The various areas or issues
emphasized by the different perspectives are discussed in general terms below.
This discussion sets the stage for subsequent consideration of the factors most
likely to cause individuals concern. .
A. Features of Human Decision-Making and Cognition
Any discussion of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty would
be incomplete without the consideration of elements of human cognition first
described by Herbert Simon, a psychologist, sociologist, and political scientist,
who was interested in the question of how human beings make decisions. In
1955, Simon published a paper introducing the notion of “bounded rationality.”133
The notion that people are boundedly rational (or “satisficers”), refers to human
beings’ limited capacity to collect, store, and retrieve information, as well as the
tendency of individuals to fail to apply standard rules of logic when making
decisions. Simon, and other proponents of bounded rationality questioned rational
choice theory (RCT), the neoclassical economic theory predicting that human
beings effectively maximize their own expected utility through decision-making
contexts.134 RCT has not held up under close empirical scrutiny.135 Social science
129

See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 128.
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These four topic areas represent the major themes in risk perception. Other themes surface in
the context of risk management, such as the appropriate role of democratic participation and
governance, philosophical considerations about the value of a small number of lives versus
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. Herbert Simon introduced the notion of “bounded rationality” in the 1950s to account for the
fact that human beings have finite computational resources available for making choices. See
generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99 (1955) and
Herbert Simon, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, VOL. 2 (1982). Simon was a prolific scholar.
Other of his important works in the area of bounded rationality include: Herbert A. Simon, Models
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Setting 198-99 (1957); Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology
with Political Science, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 293 (1985).
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ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds. 1996).
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research has revealed an extensive network of interrelated heuristics and biases
that serve as the basis for much of human decision making.136 In the simplest
terms, empirical investigations have borne out Simon’s hypothesis, demonstrating
that human beings have limited memories, an inability to gather all relevant
information and correctly weight factors, and the tendency to be influenced by
biased or irrelevant information.137
Behavioral decision theorists, who focus on identifying cognitive patterns
and social factors that influence decision-making, have been profoundly
influenced by the work of Simon.138 Eschewing rational choice theory in favor of
Simon’s bounded rationality, modern behavioral decision theorists have attempted
to explain how human beings make decisions in light of empirically demonstrated
realities of choice formation. Nowhere is this body of work more relevant than in
the context of the type of decision-making involved in evaluating risks.139 Like
other decision tasks, seeking information, analyzing the information, and
determining the appropriate involves searching, storage, and retrieval of
information, perception and reasoning.140 Hence research and theory on decisionmaking generally has clear relevance for risk perception and response. In fact,
risk responses may be particularly vulnerable to non-rational judgment formation
because this type of decision-making often involves a high degree of uncertainty.
ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing empirical investigations of how human beings process
information and make choices).
136
These heuristics and biases have been discussed under the rubric of “behavioral decision
theory” or “behavioral law and economics” and include anchoring and adjustment, optimism bias,
representativeness heuristic, hindsight bias, conjunction fallacy, endowment effect and related
status quo bias, risk aversion, and the availability heuristic, to name a few.
137
Decision-making using incomplete or imperfect information is an important feature of human
functioning in the real world. Scholarship supporting this notion is abundant. Sometimes called
behavioral decision theory, sometimes behavioral law and economics, the interdisciplinary field
that explores cognitive features of human decision-making combines law, psychology, and
economic principles—as they relate to the “rational actor”. See e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler,
supra note 65 at 1471 (“The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to explore the
implications of actual not hypothesized human behavior for the law. How do “real people” differ
from homo economicus?”) (internal parentheses omitted).
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See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
341, 347-48 (1984) [hereinafter Choices]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263-91 (1979)[hereinafter Prospect
Theory]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 430 (1972). For some early law review pieces
discussing heuristical processing and responses in legal frameworks, see Kelman et al., supra note
, at 1436-42.(discussing the availability and representative heuristics); see also, Underwood, supra
note . (“[S]tudies show that in making individualized judgments people rely primarily on
information about the case at hand, paying relatively little attention to background information
about other cases.”).
139
Id.
140
See Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, What We Have Learned so Far, in SIMPLE
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 5 (Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & ABC
Research Group, eds., Oxford University Press 1999) (showing how building blocks control
information search, stop search, and make decisions that can be put together to form classes of
heuristics).
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Moreover, information about risks is particularly well-suited to exploitation by
motivated actors.141 The literature on heuristics and biases in decision-making
can provide a good foundation for understanding particular patterns of decisionmaking in the area of risk. Limits on the rationality of human decision-making
have been discussed at length elsewhere, and have been considered specifically in
the risk perception context, often to demonstrate a systematic lack of rationality in
how individual members of the public respond to potential dangers.142
B. Characteristics of the Communication Context
Over the past century, the number of sources of information about risk has
grown tremendously. Whereas risk information used to be conveyed by public
officials, carried in newspaper stories, and, most commonly, traded during faceto-face communication between members of society, today, the risk
communication picture is increasingly multifaceted and complex. 143 Some
commentators opine that the growth in the number of communication forms have
contributed to the advent of the “risk culture” of today. According to David
Altheide,
[F]ear is more visible and routine in public discourse than it was a
decade ago .... This communication environment is part of our everyday
world; it is popular culture and we are it, and we like it; we play with it;
we play with the reporters and the institutional news sources who exploit
the fear script for their own benefits.144
Differences in how members of the public receive information about risks
mean that there are more possible sources of “input.” It also means that there is
more potential for these sources to interact and amplify or attenuate perceptions
141

See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1456 (1999)(listing the ways in which features of
human decision-making—particularly with respect to product-related risks—can be exploited for
financial gain ).
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See generally, Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2; see also generally, Cohl, supra note; Barry
Glassner, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS (2000).
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See William Leiss, Three Phases in the Evolution of Risk Communication Practice, 545 Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 85-94 (1996) (tracking the evolution of
risk communication during the last twenty years.) See generally, Baruch Fischhoff, Risk
Perception and Communication Unplugged: TwentyYears of Process 15, 2 Risk Analysis 137-45
(1995) (identifying a series of 7 different developmental stages in risk communication):
(1)All we have to do is get the numbers right
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(4) All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the past
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Id.
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Altheide, supra note 13, at 664
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about risks. For example, if Susan hears her neighbor express concern about
negative health effects from hormones in beef, she can seek out more information
on the Internet. On the Internet, she will no doubt discover a range of information
sources, from on-line news stories, to individuals expressing views via blogs or in
chat rooms, to official reports issued by the National Institutes of Health.145
Depending upon which sites she reads, she will be comforted or increasingly
concerned.146 The story is more complicated still by the fact that various patterns
of communication led to the views expressed on the websites available to Susan.
Thus, the picture of communication about risk is an increasingly complex one
consisting of expert opinion, media selection and promulgation, and social
discourse.
Risk communication research is a body of work that has grown out of the
collective attempt of investigators, agency heads and political leaders to carry on
a productive dialogue with the public about various risks.147 Many of the writings
available on risk communication have been composed with the purpose of
providing investigators, political leaders, and agency administrators with strategic
guidance regarding effective risk communication. Another broad area of research
has studied the impact of the media on how members of society view risks.148
Finally, research on the influence of heuristics and biases has revealed the
importance of features of the communication context for resulting risk
perception.149 Findings from each of these bodies of scholarship can inform a
comprehensive theory of how risk communication and idea exchange ultimately
influences risk perception.
C. The Role of Facilitators
145
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H. L. Mencken once said that “the whole aim of practical politics is to keep
the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety), by menacing it
with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.”150 Closely related to
both the bounded rationality literature and to the work on risk communication is
consideration of strategic attempts to influence mass behavior. Timur Kuran and
Cass Sunstein dub players who engage in public opinion crafting, “availability
entrepreneurs.”151 The term “availability entrepreneur” connotes a particular
ideological slant or “pet cause.” In this Article, the term facilitator is used in
place of “entrepreneur,” because the media, which plays a significant role in
shaping public beliefs, tends to be driven by different considerations than
traditional entrepreneurs such as watchdog groups, grassroots organizations, and
industry leaders. The term “facilitator” includes the availability entrepreneur (as
conceived of by Kuran and Sunstein) as well as anyone who stands to benefit
from promulgating information for purposes garnering public attention. The
media is a prime example.152
During a political campaign season or any time an individual or group is
particularly interested in advancing an agenda on the national stage, there is an
increased likelihood of risks to be publicized.153 Facilitators commonly frame
issues in a manner that makes the danger appear to be particularly imminent and
destructive.154 Often there will be a battle between facilitators with opposing
agendas, and the dangers inherent in one risk will be played up in defense of other
potential hazards.155 Facilitators’ motivations are influenced by temporal factors
and cultural factors among others. The success of such facilitators in exciting the
populace depends upon conditions such as the state of current technology, the
degree to which the population has been primed to fear certain activities and other
factors that make members of society receptive to risk communications.
D. Characteristics of the Risk
It is possible to think about the risks we face on two different levels: the
micro (individual hazard) level and the macro (general fear of hazards) level. 156
On the one hand, one might consider risk perception as it pertains to risks that
individual citizens routinely encounter. Members of the public view some classes
of hazards as particularly threatening and other classes of hazards as relatively
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See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 28, at 703.
152
The media is discussed at length in Section IV.
153
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innocuous.157 Psychometric risk researchers seek to explain differences in
attitudes about various type of potential hazards as well as identifying which
potential risks cause the most concern, and why.158 As previously noted, today’s
risks are widely characterized as particularly challenging for several reasons.
New technologies pose particular hazards because their dangers may not be
discovered for some period of time.159 Pressures to implement new technologies,
and the potential for financial gain mean that manufactures and developers may
downplay the potential for harm or may curtail research efforts. 160 Threats to
health and well-being from new products and processes may be difficult to asses,
even with substantial research findings.161 In particular, hazards associated with
novel inventions can sometimes have negative impacts into the future, threatening
the health of the nation’s children and grandchildren.162
When it comes to individual risk assessment, there are substantial
discrepancies in the perceived seriousness of various potential harms. As
discussed previously, the most common method of studying risk perception is to
ask individuals to assess various potential hazards in order to determine which are
perceived to pose the greatest risk.163 The psychometric study of risk has also
included attempts to determine which characteristics of a hazard or hazard
situation are likely to trigger concern.164 A number of empirical investigations of
risk preference have revealed some reliable patterns of “public” (as opposed to
expert) risk perception. For example, risks assumed involuntarily, and those that
are associated with unfamiliar sources and have potentially catastrophic
consequences (such as risks posed by nuclear energy) are particularly feared,165
whereas risks associated with familiar activities where the potential for harm is
157
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The familiar scourges of famine, disease, and pestilence no longer
contaminate the risk experience, which, instead, now involved negotiating a
new and perplexing array of global threats associated with modern
armaments, chemicals and radiation often invisible to the senses,
contaminants whose effects surface only after decades or generations,
hazards created by peoples and technologies in distant part of the globe, and
harms arising from the flow and control of information.
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“localized” and where the risk is voluntarily assumed, are generally characterized
as less threatening.166 By examining beliefs about latent dangers, some critical
patterns emerge that may have predictive potential in the broader public risk
perception context.
E. Characteristics of the Targets and Victims
1. The relationship between Target and Victim
One of the primary differences between traditional risk analysis, on the
one hand, and psychometric, cultural, or decision-theory based approaches to risk
management, on the other, is the source of the data. Whereas traditional risk
analysis is based upon scientific data and expert analysis, more recent approaches
have solicited the views of non-experts, so-called “average citizens.”167
Intriguing, and potentially critical questions arise with respect to whether those
evaluating risks are “stakeholders.” If the person evaluating the risk is also a
potential victim of that risk (a stakeholder), he or she may predictably respond
differently to the risk than would a non-stakeholder. An individual may also be
thought of as a stakeholder if he or she has a strong interest in the well-being of a
potential victim (as is true in the case of a parent-child relationship).
Not surprisingly, whether an individual who is evaluating a risk is a
stakeholder makes a difference in how the risk is perceived. A stakeholder can be
expected to experience more emotion with respect to a risk when that risk is selfrelevant.168 Emotions, in turn, play an important role not only in how much
people care about addressing harms, but also in how they evaluate future
outcomes. Anger, for instance, is correlated with an optimistic view, while
sadness is correlated with pessimism.169 To the extent that emotions are
heightened in stakeholders, existing predilections will be exaggerated.170
Interestingly however, respondents avoid characterizing themselves as
166
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then, is another dynamic that can be explained consistently with the view that emotion is a form of
expressive perception and not a cognitive bias.”)(internal citations omitted).
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stakeholders when possible. When there is uncertainty as to the scope and
direction of a risk, respondents are significantly more likely to see others as at risk
than they are to see themselves as potential victims.171
The risk perception picture is more complicated than the stakeholder/nonstakeholder dichotomy would suggest, because even citizens who are not directly
affected by a particular threat may care deeply about how government or private
industry responds to the harm. Specifically, risks to subgroups within the U.S. are
likely to have special significance for the American population more generally,
because how our government protects its citizens is a matter of concern to the
society as a whole.172 The oft-cited Love Canal disaster is a situation in which the
public at large received (and sought out) information about dangers facing
residents of Love Canal. Ultimately, the question for Americans watching the
Love Canal events unfold was, “How does the U.S. government respond when a
toxic waste site is discovered under a settled community?”173 A more recent
example is Hurricane Katrina; the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina
was no doubt unsettling to Americans, not only because they felt outrage over
injustices or empathy for the victims, but also because the American public
witnessed the failure of its government to adequately respond to the needs of its
citizens.174 Risk events provide citizens with opportunities to assess their
government’s ability and willingness to protect members of society. The signals
sent by government agencies and actors following a disaster can have long lasting
consequences for citizen risk perceptions, as will become evident in Section IV.175
2.
171

Language as a Product of Culture.

Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, supra note , at 149. Lerner also found that the effects of
emotion on risk perception generalizes from the perceived likelihood of self-relevant outcomes
(“will it happen to me?”) to other-relevant outcomes. This tendency is related to the optimism
bias, the tendency to attribute superior traits to oneself and to predict positive outcomes for one’s
own future. See Lauri Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in
Organizational Planning, 62 J. Applied Psychol. 194, 194 (1977)(reporting that management
students overestimated the likelihood that they will outperform competitors); K. Patricia Cross,
Not Can, But Will College Teaching Improve?, New Directions for Higher Educ., Spring 1977, at
1, 4 (citing a study indicating that ninety-four percent of college professors think that their work is
above average); see also, John R. Chambers & Paul D. Windschitl, Biases in Social Comparative
Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative-Optimism
Effects, 130 Psychol. Bull. 813, 813 (2004).
172
See Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and Reparations: Systemic Reform of Public Schools
as a Matter of Justice11 Mich. J. Race & L. 419, 423 (2006)(“individuals expect protection from
the state . . . . For the government itself to cause harm adds an element of outrage generally not
present in purely private wrongdoing.” (citing Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human
Rights Law 50 (Oxford University Press 1999)).
173
LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL 1 (State of New York Press 1982)
174
See Russel S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A
Public Choice Analysis, 127 Public Choice 55, 56 (2006) available at
http://www.peterleeson.com/Hurricane_Katrina.pdf; see also Larry Cox, A Movement for Human
Rights in the United States: Reasons for Hope 40 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 135, 145 ((citing the
desire for change sparked by “the outrage over the abandonment of people of color during
Hurricane Katrina. . .”)
175
See Section III, infra
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The term “cultural factors” includes a complex set of considerations
relating to the characteristics of a population that is influenced by shared patterns
of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding
learned through socialization within a particular group of people.176 Although
individuals within a particular culture have a variety of individual experiences,
worldviews and belief systems, they share common social values out of which
arise common understandings of important aspects of society.177
Language is a critical factor in how individuals understand risk. 178
Language is more than the medium through which probabilities about outcomes is
conveyed; it is a product of culture and subcultures, and can therefore imbue new
meaning in the process of serving as a conduit for information. For this reason,
terminology becomes critical. Certain terms and phrases carry with them
culturally defined meanings, and have moral or political dimensions that can be
quite powerful.179 Semantics contribute to risk perception in powerful ways,
particularly when language is emotive.180 Alternatively, language is used to
minimize the seriousness of a situation or to rob an issue of its emotional content.
181
For example, it has been argued that advocates of the death penalty have
176

The term “culture” has comprised many, many different definitions. See, e.g., A. L. Kroeber &
Clyde Kluckhohn, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS. (1952)
(detailing 164 separate definitions of culture).
177
See e.g., G. Hofstede, National Cultures and Corporate Cultures. in COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN CULTURES 51 (L.A. Samovar & R.E. Porter, eds., 1984) ("Culture is the collective
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from
another."); see also, J. A. Banks & C.A. McGee, MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION (1989) ("Most
social scientists today view culture as consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and
intangible aspects of human societies. The essence of a culture is not its artifacts, tools, or other
tangible cultural elements but how the members of the group interpret, use, and perceive them. It
is the values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives that distinguish one people from another
in modernized societies; it is not material objects and other tangible aspects of human societies.
People within a culture usually interpret the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviors in the
same or in similar ways."); see also, J.P. Lederach, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES (1995) ("Culture is the shared knowledge and schemes
created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social
realities around them.")
178
See Nelkin, supra note , at 95. (discussing “the complex and controversial process of evaluating
the hazards of technologies, communicating information about potential risks, and developing
appropriate controls”).
179
Moeller, Susan (2007-06-21). "Jumping on the US Bandwagon for a "War on Terror"". Yale
Global
Online.
Yale
Center
for
the
Study
of
Globalization.
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=9324 (reporting on a study that found that the U.S.
media had reported on Pakistan in terms that were biased and portrayed a monolithic population,
rather than the more accurate complex and varied culture).
180
Patricia Greenspan, Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body (2001)(draft on file with
author)(“Affect itself essentially evaluates something as in some respect good or bad--good or bad
for the organism (to be sought after or avoided), in the most primitive cases. With cognitive
development this evaluative content takes on the possibilities of semantical richness that we
associate with propositions.”)
181
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change,
107 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 534 (2007)[Hereinafter Sunstein, American Reactions] (“White House
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developed “sterile” or “medical” terms for the procedure by which a death
sentence is administered in order to mask the distasteful and frightening reality.182
Vivid language has also been used to evoke emotions in the recipient in an effort
to provoke certain behaviors. For example, public health campaigns have used
evocative language (and images) to convey messages about the consequences of
cigarette smoking, to tout the benefits of breast feeding, and to encourage safe-sex
practices.183 Previously entrenched cultural standards and values are often used
strategically to sell the message. For example, a breast-feeding campaign may
draw on images of motherhood that trigger the culturally defined role of woman
as self-sacrificing provider and protector.184 The effect of these campaigns—
when they are successful—is often to create new associations that become fixed
in cultural understandings.
These cultural understandings vary from subgroup to subgroup within a
population; subgroups often have their own set of values and priorities.
Subgroups can consist of members of a particular trade or profession, immigrant
populations, ethnic or racial groups, religious groups, or inhabitants of a particular
neighborhood or locale.185 The features that define the group serve as the basis
for communication, for example, when dairy farmers exchange information, it is
most often about aspects of the trade, when parents of children attending a
particular school see one another at a PTO meeting, they tend to talk about their
children and education issues.
One robust finding from empirical investigations of attitude formation is
the tendency of like-minded individuals to reinforce one another’s beliefs.186
Group polarization occurs in the context of risk perception as well. Accordingly,
officials under President Bush asked executive officials to use the term “climate change” in
preference of “global warming,” evidently with the belief that “climate change” is abstract and
relatively neutral).
182
An example is a typical description of the procedure used to administer the death sentence.
183
One example of a campaign that used rhetoric and imagery in this way arose out of an effort to
get women to breastfeed their infants. Joan B. Wolf, Is Breast Really Best? Risk and Total
Motherhood in the National Breastfeeding Awareness Campaign, 32 Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law 595 (2007)(“From June 2004 to April 2006, cosponsored by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services and the Ad Council, the National Breastfeeding Awareness
Campaign (NBAC) warned women that not breast-feeding put babies at risk for a variety of health
problems. "You'd never take risks before your baby is born. Why start after?" asked televised
public service announcements over images of pregnant women logrolling and riding a mechanical
bull.”)
184
See Rebecca Kukla, Ethics and Ideology in Breastfeeding Campaigns, 21HYPATIA 157-180
(2006); See also, Orit Avishai, Managing The Lactating Body: The Breast-Feeding Project and
Privileged Motherhood, 30 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY 135-152 (2007).
185
See Dora C. Lau, J. Keith Murnighan, Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The
Compositional Dynamics of Organizational Groups, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 325, 326, 329
(1998) (explaining that faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group into
subgroups based on attributes such as age, personal values, personality, race, job status).
186
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010). (“When groups of
like-minded individuals discuss issues, their views become more entrenched, and they are less
likely to be open to new or different ideas.”).
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“a group of people who fear the effects of second-hand smoke, or who believe
that pesticides carry significant risks, is likely, after discussion, to believe that the
health dangers here are extremely serious. 187 So too, a group of people who tend
to think that the risks of global warming have been exaggerated will tend to think,
after discussion, that global warming is no cause for concern.”188 Group
polarization is related to a related concept called affiliation bias, whereby experts
tend to interpret scientific findings in a manner that benefits their employers.189
The inclination to gravitate toward the view of other members of a group is called
affiliation bias190, and has been offered as evidence of irrationality in human
decision-making, although the evolutionary advantage of this tendency is clear,
given that humans are social animals that rely on one another to unravel complex
problems and accomplish higher tasks. The power and prevalence of the
affiliation bias can hardly be overstated, and its effects on risk responses are
worthy of serious consideration.
F.

Other Characteristics: Temporal and Contextual Factors

1. Contextual Factors
Several factors exogenous to the risk and target can influence risk
perceptions. Strictly speaking, “context” defined broadly, can be conceived of as
similar or the same as “culture”. For example, one aspect of the risk “context” in
western societies is our system of food production. 191 Our society has changed
from one in which we were primarily focused on producing enough to sustain the
population, to an industrialized society in which constantly developing
technologies provide more food, clothing, and shelter to a greater percentage of

187

See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 175, 176 (2002)
(explaining how polarization occurs when members of a deliberating group move toward a more
extreme point as a result of deliberation caused by the members’ predisposed views); see also,
Cass R. Sunstein, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 89, 96) (2002)
(stating that “if members of a group tend to be concerned about global warming, pesticides
causing cancer, . . . and secondhand smoke . . . they will tend to have a heightened fear of these
things.” ).
188
See Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 95.
189
Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 311.
190
Id. at 311-13.
191
See Ting-Tooney Gudykunst , CULTURE AND INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION, 30 (1988)
(The definition of “culture” is a debated issue, and has been given many different definitions in the
literature, including “a script or schema shared by a large group of people.”); see also, SURVEY OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE(SOCIOLOGY)(Frank N. Magill ed., 1994) ([Culture is] “complex patterns of living
developed by humans and passed down through the generations”); see also, A DICTIONARY OF
SOCIOLOGY.45 (G. Duncan Mitchell ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979) (Culture is defined by
“that part of the total repertoire of human action (and its products), which is socially as opposed to
genetically transmitted.”); and see Allan G. Johnson, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF
SOCIOLOGY 74 (2000)(“the accumulated store of symbols, ideas, and material products associated
with a social system, whether it be an entire society or a family is one of the major key elements of
every social system and a key concept in defining the sociological perspective.”)
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the population, while simultaneously introducing heretofore unknown risks.192
Technologies exert pressures on culture; cultures are shaped by technologies.
And technologies are, to a large extent, supported or stifled by cultural beliefs. 193
One particularly apt example is cloning. Value-laden judgments about the
wisdom of investing in, and even permitting, such a technology have influenced
the state of the science in this area.194
Technology can also interact with geography with interesting results. In
the modern, post-industrial world, pollutants generated in the Midwestern United
States travel in a predictable path to the northeastern states, and effluents from
China threaten the well-being of people living in Australia.195 Some risks are
geographically localized, and others defy geography and pose dangers to the
entire global environment and all who inhabit it.196 Accordingly, geographic
features and location of a population group can help to shape which risks become
prominent to members of that society.
2. Temporal Factors
Individuals become aware of potential hazards in a variety of ways.
Sometimes the discovery of a new health threat is revealed following the
publication of a scientific study.197 Following an environmental disaster, the
192

See Beck, supra note 9, at 19 (1992) (linking the end of the “society of scarcity” with the
advent of a new society in which novel productive forces resulted in new risks “unleashed to an
extent previously unknown.”) Id.
193
See Roger Roots, The Dangers of Automobile Travel A Reconsideration, 66 AM. J. OF ECON.
AND SOC. 959, 959 (2007)(demonstrating that despite being the leading cause of death, the greatest
killer of children and young adults, and historically criticized by experts as unsafe and inefficient,
the automobile has persisted due to America’s “love affair” with personal transportation); See
also, Lori Khan, Ethics Analysis of the Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Debate (Washburn
University) (2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119402http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119402
(demonstrating that new technologies, like stem cell research, may be hotly debated and stifled
due to opposition from powerful cultural entities, in this case religious institutions and political
parties).
194
See Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 178 (“Risk is a bellwether in social
decisions about technologies”)
195
Pollution Travels the Globe, Study Confirms, LiveScience Sept. 29, 2009 (found at:
http://www.livescience.com/environment/090929-foreign-pollution.html, last visited, July 26,
2010); Satellite Measures Pollution From East Asia to North America NASA March, 2008 (found
at http://geology.com/nasa/monitoring-pollution-by-satellite.shtml, last visited, July 26, 2010) ;
Michael Reilly, Air Pollution Travels, Kills Thousands Annually Discovery News (found at
http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2009/08/14/air-pollution-overseas.html (last visited July 26, 2010).
196
See Beck, supra note 9, at 27 (1992) (citing DDT found in arctic penguins as an example of the
globalization of risk).
197
For example, a report on the effects of long-term exposure to bisphenol A (BPA) triggered
concern among many, particularly parents of children, over the use of baby bottles and childproof
plastic cups. See The National Toxicology Program U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services NTP-CERHR, Monograph on the Potential Human Reproductive and Developmental
Effects of Bisphenol A Center For The Evaluation of Risks To Human Reproduction September
2008 NIH Publication No. 08 – 5994. For some examples of the types of events that can trigger
communication about risk, see See also, Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96.
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government, the media, and public interest groups may all communicate
information about the event.198 How the “first-line receivers” interpret and
subsequently communicate this information influences perceptions of targets
multiple iterations removed.199 Thus, order effects—the sequence in which
individuals receive the information, and how initial recipients disseminate the
information—are critical. Because the initial recipients of hazard information
have particular power to impact public perceptions, high-level officials in
government non-government organizations and agencies have enormous influence
in filtering information for public consumption.200
G. The Risk Decision Structure
Perceptions are one thing, behaviors are quite another. As social science
has amply demonstrated, beliefs do not always translate into action.201 As
empirical studies have revealed, “attitudes need not be related to behaviors,202 and
even if they are, they may be trailing rather than leading indicators. Indeed,
psychology's self-perception theory tracks the ways in which people infer their

198

The public outrage and concern following the Exxon Valdees Oil spill is one example of an
environmental disaster that triggered widespread concern over the risks posed to human and
wildlife health by oil tankers. See also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71, at 153-159.
199
Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al. supra note 4, at 180.
200
For a discussion of the role of government actors in responsible risk communication, see James
O. Mason, The Federal Role in Risk Communication and Public Education in Effective Risk
Communication 19 (Covello, V. T., McCallum, D. B, and Pavlova, M. T. eds., 1987)(“The
government’s responsibility in risk communication is to help ensure that decision of public policy
and personal practice are based on the nest available information.”)
201
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
86-88 (showing group members tend to ignore their own feelings when in a group and as a result
riskier shifts occur in judgment) ; See also, John M. Darley, Bibb Latane, Bystander Intervention
in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377
(1968) (stating that rational and irrational fears about what might happen if they intervene,
including physical harm, public embarrassment, involvement with police procedures, lost work
days and jobs, and other unknown dangers, sometimes people from assisting in what they believe
to be emergencies); See also, Rob Bond, Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A MetaAnalysis of Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN 111, 111-37 (1996)(analyzing famous study demonstrating that despite believing a line
to be a certain length, when presented with the option of conforming to statements of confederates
most will do so at odds with their own beliefs); see also, Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 371-78 (1963) (demonstrating that despite
an unwillingness to continue experiment and a belief that real harm was being done, subjects
continued to be obedient to experimenter over these beliefs); see also, Irving L. Janis, Groupthink,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY MAGAZINE, 1971, at 84. (showing that individual beliefs and concerns may
be cognitively ignored in situations where group cohesion and cooperation is more highly desired,
leading to adverse consequences).
202
Bond & Smith, supra note, at 111-37 (citing an experiment in which participants were asked to
judge which line was longer after confederates had incorrectly stated their opinions. In many
situations the subjects conformed to the group’s incorrect statements, despite looking directly at
the lines).
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attitudes from their behavior ('If I'm doing this, it must be because I like it').”203
Whether members of the public take certain steps that would reasonably be
predicted based upon their purported views involves a second set of analysis and
determinations. For example, Sunstein has pointed out that, as in the case of
reputational cascades, often individuals act on other people’s perceptions—or at
least champion the “common wisdom,” independent of their own private
attitudes.204 A full analysis of public risk perception requires an examination of
how the decision structure can influence the behavior outcome in light of the
adopted view.
Risk perception is relevant for purposes of two categories of behaviorbased outcomes. One is personal practice and the other is public policy.205 The
former is an area where risk perception can (although it often doesn’t) directly
influence exposure to a potential hazard. The latter is influenced by public risk
perception when the public puts pressure on policy makers to take action, in the
form of legislation, regulation, or resource allocation, in order to influence
perceived threats.206 In a strict dictatorship, absent a revolt or a coup, the
discontent of the people will have little direct impact on how a government
chooses to protect (or fail to protect) its citizens. A well-functioning democracy,
on the other hand, should be responsive to the wishes and needs of the
populace.207 In the context of this type of political environment, public perception
often—for good or for ill—impacts policy adoption.208 The political and power
structure of a society becomes an important factor in whether the beliefs of the
members of society translate to government action. Even in the context of a
203

Baruch Fischhoff & Ilya Fischhoff, Will They Hate Us? Anticipating Unacceptable Risks 3
Risk Management, 7, 11 (2001). See also, Daryl J. Bem, Self Perception Theory, in 6 Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology 1-574 (Leonard Berkowitz 1979); See also, Russel H. Fazio, SelfPerception Theory: A Current Perspective, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: Ontario Symposium 129
(Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson, & C. Peter Herman eds. 1987); see also, Daryl J. Bem, SelfPerception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena, 74 PSYCHOL.
REV. 183, 183-200 (1967) ; see also, Walter B. Cannon, The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A
Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory, 100 American Journal of Psychology 567, 56786 (1987) (emotions follow physical reactions, i.e., because my body is crying I must be sad).
204
See generally, Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 95 at 67.
205
See Mason, supra note 179, at 19. (“The government’s responsibility in risk communication is
to help ensure that decision of public policy and personal practice are based on the nest available
information.”)
206
See generally, Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 71.
207
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating “ . . . Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever
any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principle and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness . . . ”)
208
See James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010)
(despite failure of tough on crime approach, politicians continue to ratchet up penalties for
criminals despite mounting evidence that such practices do not work, in order to win votes from a
public that perceives an increase in crime) ; See also Kahan, supra note 172, (demonstrating that
new technologies, like stem cell research, may be hotly debated and stifled due to opposition from
powerful cultural entities, in this case religious institutions and political parties).
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genuine democracy, the translation of public belief to political action is imperfect,
of course. For one thing, democratic governments are rarely characterized as
“efficient” law-making structures.209 For another, policy makers are influenced
by the same variables as other members of society, and may be guided by a
separate, if related set of biases.210 Both because the populace exerts pressure on
lawmakers and because lawmakers are themselves members of the society, public
risk perception is at the heart of risk policy decisions. 211 But to say this is not to
suggest that the risk preferences of members of the population are routinely
considered when risk decisions are made. Rather, the public’s influence tends to
surface in a random and haphazard fashion, such as when a particular risk is
suddenly brought to light, or a particularly bad policy decision results in public
outrage.212 The role of individual members of society need not be so limited.
Members of the public are often as well equipped to evaluate hazards as are law
and policy-makers, if given access to pertinent information; they possess a range
of talents and education that might be relevant to such situations; and they are
heavily invested in such choices.
The foregoing list of considerations represents the collective focus of the
various theoretical perspectives to date. The model goes far in achieving insight
into this area, but is not exhaustive.213 Risk is a sufficiently ubiquitous
phenomenon that relevant inputs are almost endless, and theories regarding
209

Forman, supra note 187, at 993. (public policy influenced by majority for election purposes
leading to bad outcomes); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability
and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (1988) (democracy
inefficient because voters are ignorant, it suffers from procedural defects, there is a problem with
majority tyranny, and it is too expensive, among other criticisms); see Whitford, Andrew B. and
Lee, Soo-Young, The Efficiency and Inefficiency of Democracy in Making Governments
Effective: Cross-National Evidence (2009). APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450743 (democracy may be inefficient for countries suffering
from the “dictator/disorder” dilemma).
210
See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
(Oxford 1992).
211
See Khan, supra note 172(explaining that public policies often made to satisfy voters or
unhappy sects rather than by sound logic and empirical evidence); See also Forman, supra note
187, at 993; see also David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary
Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315, 1329-30 (2003)(pointing out that lawmakers are influenced by
public sentiment).
212
An example of just such a situation was the response to Hurricane Katrina. Prior to the
destruction from the storm, the American public was largely unaware and uninformed about the
risk presented by the potential for large-scale storms to create severe flooding conditions. After
August 29, 2005, when 80% of New Orleans was flooded, the media and lawmakers began to
include public sentiment in the conversation. See e.g. Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate
Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and Rising Seas Levels: The Costs of
Doing Nothing, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 1127, 1157-97 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of public
reaction to Hurricane Katrina for future government response to the problem of climate change);
see also,News Hour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, Public Opinion After Katrina (Wednesday, August
25) (“National polls are showing a drop in public support not only for President Bush, but also
highlighting strong disapproval of governments at all levels in their response to Hurricane
Katrina.”)
213
See Appendix.
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foundations and sources of concern are constantly evolving. 214 However, the
factors listed here provide a solid starting point for a comprehensive discussion of
antecedents to risk discernment among members of the public.
IV.

CATEGORIES OF FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK PERCEPTION

Individuals’ beliefs about risks are complex, and rarely can be accurately
represented in simple terms.215 The public has a broad concept of risk that
incorporates a wide variety of considerations.216 This intricate network of factors
relevant to public risk perception has been contrasted with the formal risk
management models which define riskiness based upon mortality and measured in
probabilities.217 A careful method of examination of the risk perception
scholarship and a distillation of the major factors empirically demonstrated to
influence judgments about and responses to dangers yields a list of specific
characteristics that can help predict when the public will become alarmed. At this
stage of the project, these factors are listed. Their relative strength and level of
influence of these factors is variable, and unquestionably depend upon the unique
combination of factors making up the interaction in any given situation.218 This
Article is designed to encourage future scholarship and commentary on public
risk perception. In addition, the model presented here has significant practical use
for law and policy formation. Understanding the particular antecedents to public
anxiety can help risk managers make decisions that comport with public
preferences. Specifically, having a specific set of predictors can assist
government officials in predicting when widespread concern will arise and in
managing public risk responses.
A.

Priming or Inoculation

One characteristic common to large segments of a population is the degree to
which its members have been primed or inoculated regarding certain potential
sources of danger. Much risk-related priming occurs on a wide-scale basis
because sources of information about risks and communication and experiences

214

Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31, at 128. (discussing two different risk
approaches to a single risk analysis; whether a product is reasonably safe).
215
See generally, Robert E. O'Connor, Richard J. Bard, & Ann Fisher, Risk Perceptions, General
Environmental Beliefs, and Willingness to Address Climate Change, 19 Risk Anal., 461 (2006)
(discovering a complicated relationship between individuals’ general environmental beliefs and
their willingness to advocate for prevention in the area of climate change).
216
is possibly redundant to cite, since it was cited in the prior sentence in different wording
217
See generally, Slovic supra note 35,
218
Results from some studies demonstrate sensitivity to context and covarying features that
increases the difficulty in making detailed global predictions. See e.g., M.G. Morgan, Baruch
Fischhoff, B., A. Bostrom, & C. Atman, RISK COMMUNICATION: THE MENTAL MODELS
APPROACH (2001).
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related to hazards reach a broad segment of society.219 Priming describes the
phenomenon whereby exposure to a stimulus influences the response to a later
stimulus.220 Certain primes or triggers can help to determine cognitive and
affective—or emotion-base— reactions to later targets or events.221 In risk
perception terms, early experiences influence subsequent reactions to potential
hazards.222 The priming effect is based upon the fact that early impressions last.
Put simply, impressions and preferences are sticky—and this is doubly so in the
context of risk assessments.223 Priming has been discussed in terms of both
cognitions and emotions. Social psychologists have coined the phrase “cognitive
priming” to describe the process whereby one idea or practice becomes associated
with other ideas or practices.224 Priming is also an affect-based process. The
focus on affect as a powerful determinant in reactions to risk-related information
has gained increasing attention in the legal and extra-legal scholarship. Emotion
is a powerful element of priming perceptions of future potential dangers,
particularly when fear is induced.225
In the risk perception literature, priming of risk has been discussed as
“signaling.” Risk researchers have suggested that to the degree that an event is
associated with a risk, that event can act as an important signal.226 Paul Slovic
cites the disaster at Three Mile Island (TMI) as a striking example of an event
219

For example, although personal exposures vary, Americans share the common experiences of
Three Mile Island, the attacks of September 11 2001, and Hurricane Katrina. American citizens
tune into the same national nightly news and cable news outlets, receive information from the
same major newspapers, and are protected by the same federal agencies.
220
See Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, supra note 90, at 1023. (“priming effects incorporate the
notion of spreading activation, which posits that similar concepts are linked together in memory
within a network of nodes and that activation of one concept results in the spreading of the
activation along the network to other related concepts”).
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S.T. Murphy & Robert B. Lajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming with
Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. Person. Soc. Psych. 723, 723 (1993) (finding
that millisecond-long encounters with negative or positive stimuli can produce non-specific
emotional reactions to unrelated stimuli,
222
Fear has been empirically linked to priming effects wherein the salience of an earlier event
influences or “primes” future perception of risks. For an example of this phenomenon in the
context of international environmental law, see Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Differences
in the Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources, in The Political Economy of
American Trade Policy 385, 434-437 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1996).
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See generally, D. A. Sherman et al., AFFECTIVE PERSEVERANCE: COGNITIONS
CHANGE BUT PREFERENCES STAY THE SAME (1998). See also, Paul Slovic,
Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on Judgment and
Decision-Making, 1 Roger Williams L. Rev. 172 (2000) (hereinafter Slovic,
Rational Actors) (discussing the perseverance of induced preferences).
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See Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, supra note 90, at 1015. (describing the influence of observed
behavior in inducing like behavior).
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See Slovic, Rational Actors, supra note 220 at 172 (discussing studies demonstrating the role of
affect in the formation of preference). See also, Sherman et al., supra note; Robert B. Zajonc,
Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING &
THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION, 31, 49-50 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000)
(suggesting that priming is almost entirely an affective process).
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See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31 at 9.
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with high signal potential.227 TMI did not result in any loss of human life, yet the
impact of the accident was monumental.228 Widespread public fear and outrage
occurred following the incident, resulting in serious consequences for the utility
plant involved as well as increased regulations on the nuclear energy industry.229
The public viewed TMI as signaling the disaster and danger potential of nuclear
reactor, and the accident primed a large segment of the population to react with
fear and distrust to nuclear energy.230
Large scale alarm following an event like TMI makes perfect sense if one
thinks about the public reaction as part of a learning process; once the public
understood that an accident like TMI was possible, individuals were
understandably fearful of the potential for future disasters at nuclear reactor
plants. However, the reaction to hazardous discoveries and events can be
complex. As Slovic points out:
227

Slovic, Perception II supra note 8, at 283. See also generally, Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, et al.
supra note 4 .
228
The Washington Post has described the accident and the aftermath:
Before the 1979 accident at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island, few had heard of
the nuclear power plant on the Susquehanna River. But the crisis that began . . . in
the early morning of March 28 quickly turned the plant and its giant cooling
towers into icons in the long national argument over the safety of nuclear energy.
The initial information from the accident in the Unit 2 reactor was sketchy and
contradictory. The utility company that ran the plant said the situation was
manageable. But officials from mayor's offices to the Oval Office worried about
possible complications that would shower radioactivity on the small communities
around Three Mile Island – or perhaps even farther. Government engineers feared
that the reactor's nuclear fuel would melt out of its thick steel and cement
encasement, or that a hydrogen gas bubble in the core would explode.
In Harrisburg, less than 10 miles away, the state's new governor struggled with
conflicting advice on whether to begin an evacuation that might affect more than
600,000 people. In Washington, 100 miles south, federal regulators anxiously
sought reliable information to guide local authorities and the president, former
nuclear engineer Jimmy Carter.
In the two decades since Three Mile Island, the plant has become a rallying
symbol for the anti-nuclear movement. But the nuclear power industry, which has
not built a single new plant in the United States since 1979, says the accident
showed that its safety systems worked, even in the most extreme circumstances.
Revelations during the decade-long cleanup of the crippled reactor showed that
its core was more seriously damaged than originally suspected. But scientists still
disagree on whether the radiation vented during the event was enough to affect the
health of those who lived near the plant.
20 Years Later: A Nuclear Nightmare in Pennsylvania The Washington Post, Mark
Stencel,
March 27, 1999 (found at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/tmi/tmi.htm) (last visited, July 10, 2009).
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Slovic, Perception II supra note 8, at 283.
230
Id. This growing skepticism and anxiety over nuclear power altered the future of the industry in
the United States. “A federal investigation, assigning blame to human, mechanical, and design
errors, recommended changes in reactor licensing and personnel training, as well as in the
structure and function of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The accident also increased public
concern over the dangers of nuclear power . . .” Three Mile Island, Columb. Encyclopedia, Sixth
Edition. (2008) (http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-ThreeMil.html) (last visited, July 10,
2009).
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An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little social disturbance
. . . if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (such as a train
wreck). However, a small accidence in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived
as poorly understood), such as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA
laboratory, may have an immense social consequences if it is perceived as a
harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.231

Undoubtedly, certain characteristics of the risk help to determine its signal
potential. In the case of TMI, the involuntariness, unfamiliarity, and potential for
catastrophe created the perfect storm. Such features of the risk (discussed in
detail below) are important not only for initial perceptions of an incident, but also
determine whether an incident will prime or signal the population, creating lasting
attitudes about certain classes of activities.
B.

Features of the Risk

Three Mile Island is a classic example of how certain features of a
circumstance can signal danger to the public. Another example is the fear of
terrorism following September 11, 2001 (“9/11”). Although TMI and the attacks
of 9/11 were different in many respects, with respect to priming fear, TMI and 911 shared some important features. They were both sudden and unexpected.
They were both accompanied by vivid images of destruction.232 The risks from
terrorism and from the meltdown of a nuclear reactor are risks that are beyond the
control of the average U.S. citizen. These examples are stunning illustrations of
how powerful certain risk characteristics can be in shaping public perceptions. As
central as these features of the risk situation were in explaining widespread fear,
these characteristics are not important considerations for traditional risk
management decisions, which tend to be focused on quantitative assessments of
likelihood and consequences.
The psychometric approach has been most instrumental in identifying
features of an activity most likely to cause concern.233 Empirical work using
survey materials have asked respondents to rank or rate activities for their
riskiness and have then asked respondents to judge the activities along various
dimensions. Results typically consist of perceptions of riskiness of a variety of
activities and corresponding characterizations of each of the activities.234 For
231

Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283.
It is important to note that the TMI imagery was communicated through descriptions of
“nuclear meltdown,” “raining radioactive material,” and “the explosion of a hydrogen bubble.”
The vivid images were never, fortunately, witnessed. In contrast, the images of death and
destruction from 9-11 were real, devastating, witnessed by millions, and still widely available in
digital photo and video archives. See e.g., www.september11news.com/AttackImages.htm;
http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/shattered/; http://revver.com/video/59686/september-112001-what-we-saw/ (all last visited, Mar. 10, 2010).
233
Empirical work on risk characteristics is referred to, collectively, as the psychometric study of
risk perception. See Section I supra.
234
See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280.
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example, one of the most important early psychometric studies on risk perception
asked respondents to evaluate thirty activities and technologies with respect to the
perceived benefit to society; the perceived risk, the acceptability of the current
level of risk; and the risk’s position on each of nine dimensions of risk.235 Later
surveys expanded the survey to add dimensions and revised the methodology.
Psychometric survey data has revealed some interesting patterns about the
risks about which people are particularly concerned and the characteristics that
trigger special consideration in risk perception. Respondents tend to evaluate a
risk based upon factors such as how well the risk is understood, how controllable
the risk is, and the type of emotion triggered by the harm.236 Specifically, the
early work of Fischhoff and colleagues found that “people are influenced by
whether a risk is potentially catastrophic, faced by future generations,
involuntarily incurred, uncontrollable, delayed rather than immediate, and
particularly dreaded.”237 Paul Slovic, another pioneer in the psychometric
method, has similarly noted that “perception of risk is greater for hazards whose
adverse effects are uncontrollable, dread (sic), catastrophic, fatal rather than
injurious, not offset by compensating benefits, and delayed in time so the risks are
borne by future generations.”238 Slovic and his colleagues have grouped risk
features into two broader categories: the dread risk factor and the unknown risk
factor.239 The dread risk factor includes the degree to which respondents
experience feelings of dread or calm in response to the risk, the perceived
voluntary or involuntary assumption of the risk, the extent to which the risk is
controllable or uncontrollable, and whether or not the risk is judged to have
catastrophic effects.240 The dread factor is directly related to the role of affect in
risk perception, which is discussed in detail below. The unknown risk factor
includes characteristics such as whether the risk is familiar or unfamiliar to the
target, known or unknown to science, and novel or old.241 Several of these key
characteristics of risks merit a more detailed discussion.242
1.
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Controllability

See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31 at 9.
See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 282.
237
See Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31.
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Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 190.
239
Slovic’s work, in particular, identified two main cognitive factors which dominate individuals’
perception of risk. See generally, Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2.
240
Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note, 2 at 1997 (“A risk is dreaded to the extent it is perceived to be
uncontrollable, involuntary and potentially catastrophic in its consequences.”)
241
See Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 281-83..
242
The 1978 Fischhoff et al. study asked respondents to rate risks according to the following
criteria: 1. Voluntariness of risk; 2. Immediacy of effect; 3. Knowledge about risk by the targets;
4. Knowledge about risk to science; 5. Control over risk; 6. Newness of risk; 7. Chronic versus
catastrophic; 8. Common versus dreaded (“Is this a risk that people have learned to live with and
can think about reasonably calmly, or is it one that people have great dread for-on the level of a
gut reaction?”); 9. Severity of consequences (“How likely is it that the consequence will be
fatal?”). See Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, et al., supra note 31 at 130.
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The feeling of control is an important influence on human behavior.243
When individuals perceive that they have control over events, they experience
less fear.244 Conversely, risks over which people perceive that they have little
influence are likely to be viewed as more dangerous and less acceptable.245
Examples of uncontrollable hazards include airplane crashes, dangers from
electric power, and harms from transport of hazardous materials.246 As Slovic
notes, “motor vehicle accidents are much less dreaded because people think they
can control their vulnerability (‘It won't happen to me because I drive more safely
than most people’)” 247 In sum, “perceived lack of control is a key factor behind
high risk perception . . .”248
The control issue becomes important in particular contexts.249
Environment and technology risks tend to be seen as not under one's control.
These types of hazards are viewed as primarily the responsibility of the
government.250 Lifestyle risks, on the other hand, are judged to be a matter of
personal responsibility. 251 Risk perception can also vary, depending upon who is
surveyed. Certain subgroups within a population seem to be less risk averse, a
fact that may be related to the fact that these same groups have a greater measure
of power and control in society generally.252
2.

Familiarity

The public is less concerned about risks that are familiar (such as
household accidents) than they are about risks that are unfamiliar (such as nuclear
waste).253 This fact illustrates the principle that familiarity with a given risk
mediates public fear and judgments about the appropriate public response to the
hazard.254 The “unknown’ risk factor includes characteristics such as known–
unknown to the individual, known–unknown to science, and new–old.255
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George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 Organizational
Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 272, 274 (1996)
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Paul Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectives on Protective Behavior, in Taking
Care: Understanding and Encouraging Self-Protective Behavior 14 (Neil D. Weinstein ed., 1987).
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Slovic, PERCEPTION supra note 2 at 988.
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Lennart Sjöberg, The Different Dynamics of Personal and General Risk, Risk Management, 19,
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Id. at 19-34.
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Familiarity has been linked to affective components of risk perception, such as
dread—or more informally—fear and anxiety.256 The familiarity effect is likely
related to illusion of control, a cognitive bias that leads individuals to perceive
that they have more control over their own fates and external events than they
really do.257 When potential harms are familiar, people have the sense that
knowledge of the factors leading to the harm and the effects of the harm, better
position them to prevent the harm.258 There is clearly something to this sentiment.
When people understand risk factors, they are better able to educate themselves
about prevention, and are better prepared to prevent the harm. Of course, in order
to avoid the dangers, knowledge must lead to effective action. Regardless, human
beings prefer to suffer ailments that are known than those whose course and
outcomes are unpredictable.259
Importantly, familiarity can have contradictory effects, at times increasing
perceptions of the likelihood of risk. When a danger is cognitively “available,”
people will be more likely to be able to bring instances to mind, and will therefore
judge the danger to be common or likely to occur in the future.260 The rule of
thumb that leads people to believe that something is more likely if they can
readily bring to mind relevant examples is the aforementioned availability
heuristic. Therefore, an unfamiliar threat, particularly if it is connected with a
new, complex technology that is not well understood, may create more anxiety
than a more common threat, the parameters of which are relatively well known.261
However, very common and familiar dangers are often associated with more
recent or frequent examples, heightening perception of associated harms.262
Ultimately, members of the public are least fearful of harms that are sufficiently
familiar so as not to trigger a special fear associated with ambiguous and
potentially disastrous outcomes, but not so familiar so as to be featured repeatedly
256

Baker, supra note , at 346, 352. (noting circumstances and relationships between risks that are
familiar and dreaded in regard to public preference)
257
Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 280.
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See Paul Slovic, Ellen Peters, Donald G. MacGregor, Melissa L. Finucane, Affect, Risk, and
Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S35-S40, S36 (2005) ( “while people may be able to ‘do
the right thing’ without analysis (e.g. dodge a falling object) it is unlikely that they can use
analytic thinking rationally without guidance from affect…[which] is essential to rational action.”)
259
Slovic, Perception II supra note 8 at 283. (examine fig. 2 demonstrating that generally people
desire more regulation and protection from unknown risks as opposed to known risks)
260
See generally, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (discussing the availability heuristic, among other
heuristics and biases).
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See Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, supra note , at 86. (fig 1 and 2 showing that the most
feared risks included the unknown and new technology, e.g. nuclear power, nuclear weapons,
nerve gas, and DNA research)
262
For instance, one study involved showing individuals a list of well-known men and women,
and whether male or female names appeared more frequently. Respondents’ judgments regarding
frequency were directly influenced by the relative fame individuals associated with the names.
When shown lists featuring well-known men but not well known women, respondents believed
that men’s names appeared more frequently. However, when presented with lists in which the
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in the media or in public discourse. Harms such as diabetes, asthma, and obesity
have been cited as examples of dangers that exact a toll in terms of human health
and morbidity far greater than that which would be suggested by the public’s
professed concern.263
3.

Voluntariness

People are particularly frightened by risks that are involuntary.264 The
extent to which risks associated with an activity are voluntarily assumed was one
of the earliest hypothesized influences on risk judgments.265 Early psychometric
investigations reinforced the idea that voluntarily assumed risks are more
palatable to the public and judged to be less problematic than non-voluntary
hazards by a large margin.266 The voluntariness quality is related to the issue of
control, and reinforces the notion that when members of the public perceive that
they have control over exposure to potential harms, they are less fearful.267 The
prevalence of the voluntariness characteristic of risk in risk perception scholarship
points to its robust influence on the public’s normative judgments about harms. 268
Certain theoretical perspectives place particular emphasis on this
characteristic. One example is the “revealed preferences” theory, which
advocates an historical examination of the use of certain technologies to gauge the
acceptability of certain risks and risk characteristics.269 According to Chauncey
Starr’s research, individuals appear willing to accept risks posed by voluntary
activities (e.g., skiing, driving a car, traveling by commercial jet) about 1000
times greater than they would tolerate from involuntary sources (e.g., food
preservatives, nuclear energy, natural disasters) that provide the same level of
benefit.270 Slovic and his colleagues, using a non-historical, survey methodology,
found that respondents preferred somewhat higher risk levels for voluntary, as
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Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003, 1016 (2003)
(noting the relative lack of concern among Americans over health risks stemming from obesity);
see also Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Experimental Psychol.:
Human Learning and Memory 551 (1978)(noting that certain causes of death (accidents,
homicides, tornadoes, fires, and cancer) were relatively overestimated, while others (stroke,
diabetes, tuberculosis, asthma) were underestimated.
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See Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, supra note 31, at 83.
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45, at 1232-38.
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opposed to involuntary activities.271 Although Starr’s initial estimates of
preference for voluntary risks appear high (a survey of studies has revealed that
voluntary risks are preferred by a factor of 100 to 1000) choice in exposure to risk
remains an important factor in risk analysis. 272
4.

Catastrophic Potential

Whether the risk carries with it the potential for catastrophe is another
important consideration.273 A definition of “catastrophic” is the potential to affect
many people simultaneously.274 Research has revealed that respondents are less
tolerant of risks carrying the potential for catastrophe than traditional risk analysis
or “rational theory” would predict. Specifically, individuals would prefer a
certain loss of a relatively small number of lives over a period of years than a
small risk of a large number of lives at a single point in time.275 Risks with
catastrophic potential are reportedly perceived by the public as up to fifty times
more risky than non-catastrophic risks. Moreover, surveys have revealed that
voluntary risks are preferred by a factor of 100 to 1000.276 This may also be
related to the issue of perceived control and status quo.277 The “natural” state of
affairs is more similar to a small loss of a number of lives over an extended period
of time. Human beings suffer various ailments that compromise health and
shorten lives due to familiar causes like heart disease, cancer, liver disease,
diabetes, respiratory disease and accidents. Although death by these means is no
less tragic than death by other means, members of the public are used to loss of
life through these means. In contrast, catastrophic loss involving sudden loss of
multiple lives strike individuals as particularly upsetting.278 Examples of such
catastrophic losses include those incurred following plane crashes, explosions,
and natural disasters. Because they are fairly rare, they are unfamiliar, and
because they result in multiple lives lost, they induce a level of fear that is out of
proportion with the level of fear that would be predicted by standard rational
choice theory.279 Risks assumed on an individual level, such as those posed by
cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption, and driving a motor vehicle are judged
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as less fear-inducing in part because the consequences of such risks are seldom
catastrophic.280
Another characteristic of risk that is related to catastrophic potential is the
reversibility of associated harms. Not surprisingly, individuals are more
concerned about risks they perceive to have long-term and potentially irreversible
effects.281 The qualities of being catastrophic and being irreversible have been an
indication for the need to take extra precautions for countries and governments no
less than individuals.282 The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development asserts: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”283 Calls to replace traditional risk analysis have
integrated these concerns over the potential for an increasing pace of
technological ingenuity to outpace careful investigation and understanding of
potential effects having irreversible consequences, with implications for current
and future generations.284
5.

Equity

Less ubiquitous, but still present in the psychometric literature is the
concern citizens have regarding the potential for inequitable distribution of risks.
Particularly prevalent is the worry that historically disadvantaged members of the
population are disproportionately exposed to harms. The unequal exposure to
risk of a particular identifiable population may trigger outrage and indignation,
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depending upon the history and perceived vulnerability of the group.285 Beck
draws parallels between the modern allocation of risk and outcome with
“legitimate” methods of wealth distribution.286 Risks, like resources, posses the
characteristic of profoundly affecting quality of life, and, like resources, risks are
virtually never uniformly distributed across all segments of society.287
Differences will be particularly acute in populations that share a history of
discrimination with respect to risk exposure.288 Dangers threaten the lives, health,
and property of members of society, but they may also jeopardize psychological
security, freedoms, and interpersonal relationships.289 Nowhere is this more
relevant than in situations in which members of society are systematically and
disproportionately subjected to particular types of risks.290 A prominent example
is the environmental justice movement, where a rising tide of concern and unrest
has led to efforts to reshape environmental policy.291
Publications written for risk management professionals or for
governmental agencies, commonly caution against ignoring potentially
discriminatory practices and selective protection. The Environmental Protection
Agency, for example, has published material suggesting that much of the debate
over environmental degradation has been related to questions of who has power to
effect decisions, and how this might implicate issues of fairness and equality.
This work provides specific advice based on the work of various risk perception
experts.292 The EPA has endorsed the systematic examination of potentially
unequal exposure to pollutants across various disadvantaged communities.293
285
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influenced environmental research and policy).
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Widespread concern over inequalities in environmental protections has led to
organizing efforts in order to heighten awareness and advance more progressive
policies and practices.294
C.

Cultural and Personal Identity Factors

Cultural approaches to risk perception and assessment have had two
general foci. The first is the role of different identified “worldviews” on the
individual’s experience of risk.295 The second is on the role of emotion (or affect)
on risk perception.296 The idea that culture-based studies identify individual
differences that might influence risk perception may seem incongruous, given that
the study of culture is usually conceived of socially cultivated understandings
common to a group of people.297 However, the importance of an individual’s
worldview is a common emphasis in the cultural definition of risk response, so
that individual variations in worldviews assume relevance for purposes of risk
evaluations.298 Emotional reactions to dangers are then viewed as expressions of
these individually held but culturally derived values and norms.299
1.

Emotions

Significant debate has centered on the question of whether emotions play an
adaptive or maladaptive role in risk evaluation has generated substantial debate.300
There are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The
analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus,
formal logic, and risk assessment. This system is relatively slow, effortful, and
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requires conscious control.301 The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly
automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness.302 The experiential
system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and
remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies
on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling
that something is good or bad).303 This system represents risk as a feeling that
tells us whether it's safe to walk down a dark street or drink strange-smelling
water.304
Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as
across-the-board irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and
the experiential systems of individuals operate in parallel, and each seems to
depend on the other for guidance.305 Studies have demonstrated that analytic
reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect.306
According to Slovic,
Various studies demonstrate that affect is a strong conditioner of preference,
whether or not the cause of that affect is consciously perceived. They also
demonstrate the independence of affect from cognition, indicating that there may
be conditions of affective or emotional arousal that do not necessarily require
cognitive appraisal. This affective mode of response, unburdened by cognition
and hence much faster, has considerable adaptive value.307

Judgments of potential sources of harms are highly correlated with emotional
valence, as measured by respondent ratings on scales such as good/bad,
nice/awful, and dread/not dread.308 These empirical results suggest the
importance not only of analytic evaluations of an activity or a technology, but also
of affective reactions to that activity. While some have argued that emotions are
simply a byproduct of reason-based decisions about risk,309 this possibility has
been largely refuted by findings suggesting that emotional reactions come first,
and that effortful reasoning processes supplement or justify initial affective
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reactions.310 Moreover, emotion-based evaluations can lead to optimal decisionmaking. Findings from psychological studies on choice formation suggest that
decision-makers often optimize outcomes when they stick with initial “gut”
judgments. 311 Analyzing costs and benefits of various courses of action can lead
to decisions that people later regret, and those that are inconsistent with later
behavior and preferences.312
Even if emotions do not consistently serve as optimal cues for riskdecision purposes, they may serve as signals for personal beliefs that have
enormous value to the human-being who holds them.313 The value of affective
reactions is explicit in the “cultural evaluator” model advanced by Dan Kahan.
The cultural evaluator model of risk perception views emotional responses to risk
as reflective of an individual’s culturally defined, expressive evaluation of
potential dangers.314 According to Kahan, “When people draw on their emotions
to judge the risk that such an activity poses, they form an expressively rational
attitude about what it would mean for their cultural worldviews for society to
credit the claim that that activity is dangerous and worthy of regulation ....”315
The cultural evaluator model rejects both the neoclassical economic rational actor
model (which claims that risk decisions involve analytical optimization strategies)
and the behavioral-decision-theory model (which views emotions as biases). 316
Instead of taking a pessimistic view of affect, cultural risk theory views
emotion as signaling underlying values, which themselves have worth.317 In sum,
“emotional responses to risk can be understood as tools, guiding the individual
toward decisions that serve deeply held values and preferences . . . “it is not, after
all, irrational for members of society to care about meanings and not just about
consequences, and to form positions on risk that express their cultural values.”318
As Kahan points out, “individuals' decisions to forgo or forbear risks is based not
on the expected utility of those actions but on their social meanings, which are
unlikely to be tied in any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those
310
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315
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risks.”319 Emotions are highly dependent upon other features of the risk
context.320 When there is a known, hated perpetrator, when there is an act that is
outrageous, there will be more agitation, perhaps not out of fear per se, but out of
a hybrid of fear and loathing for the source of the fear.321 A recent example from
American history is Osama Bid Laden.322
2.

Cultural Worldviews

There are two ways of categorizing characteristics of the risk perceiver.
The first is based upon demographic information.323 The second involves what
cultural risk scholars call cultural worldview typology.324 Proponents of this
typology believe that a person’s risk preferences are guided by their moral or
philosophical approach to the world. 325 By defining people as high or low on
control (grid) and social commitment (group), the cultural worldview typology
makes certain predictions about how individuals will form judgments about a
wide range of potential dangers.326
Members of society who have hierarchic orientations tend to accept risks,
provided that the risk is legitimated by governmental authorities or other
authoritarian experts; however, they are deeply distrustful of risks that threaten
the social order.327 Egalitarians, on the other hand, are presumed to reject risks
that are imposed by a small group on a large group, particularly when the
imposition is by those in authority and when effects will affect future
generations.328 Fatalists have low sympathy for group attachment, but a strong
orientation toward socially assigned classifications, and Individualists tend to
reject social structures and group attachment.329 Orientation toward the group is
hypothesized to have profound influences on risk perception.330 Individual
worldviews might also interact with risk characteristics. For example, there is
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some thought that personality variables influence an individual’s degree of
concern over the potential for catastrophic outcomes generally.331
3.

Self-Relevance

One unsurprising finding is that the more relevant a particular hazard is to
a certain subgroup, the more concern members of that group express about that
risk. For example, research has found that age-related illnesses are particularly
feared by respondents of advanced age.332 Certain populations within a society
assign higher importance to some risks than other groups based upon a shared
vulnerability to associated risks.333 Such groups often mobilize in an attempt to
gain attention and resources for the adoption of risk reduction in areas the group
perceives as important for one reason or another.334 One category of risk that is
particularly likely to be relevant to large segments of the population is those risks
likely to be catastrophic in nature.335 The self-relevance feature may help to
explain why catastrophic risks (or those risks perceived as catastrophic) are more
likely to cause wide-spread panics.336 A lack of perceived self-relevance may
also explain why some serious risks receive surprisingly little attention. An
example is climate change.337 Until recently, climate change received relatively
little public attention. Climate change is a harm that is hard to experience
personally. No doctor will diagnose a patient with “climate change” and give the
patient six months to live. Because natural disasters tend to be localized, it can be
difficult to connect dramatic weather events (which do have relevance to
members of the population) with global climate change.
D.

Additional Relevant Features of the Risk Context

A number of additional aspects of the risk situation are relevant in
predicting which types of harms will cause individuals particular anxiety. These
features do not fit easily into the aforementioned categories, and yet they are
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significant considerations and germane to any attempt to construct an effective
risk-perception prediction model.
1.

Benefits of Activity / Cost of Precautions

Traditional risk analysis featured the benefits associated with a potentially
harmful activity as a central consideration. Later attempts to determine social
acceptability also made benefits a pivotal feature of risk assessment.338 Although
experts who engage in cost-benefit analysis diverge from the public substantially
with respect to some criteria for risk response, both experts and members of the
public care about the benefit associated with a risk. Ultimately, the public will
accept more risk for activities that are more beneficial.339
Conversely, if
individuals perceive that they will have to make personal sacrifices in order to
reduce the chance of a potential danger materializing, they may well profess less
concern about the danger. 340 The importance of realized benefits to the
acceptability of risks may be captured at least indirectly by the measure of
voluntariness.341 As Frank Cross points out, “The voluntary acceptance of risk
helps ensure that the same group incurs both the risk and the benefit of an activity
(otherwise the community bearing the risk is unlikely to voluntarily accept it). An
involuntarily borne risk, by contrast, may compel one group to accept the risk,
while others benefit.342
2.

Concreteness or Cognitive Availability

Behavioral researchers call the human tendency to “place more weight on
concrete, emotionally interesting information than on more probative abstract
data” as the vividness bias.343 As previously mentioned, vivid language is
frequently used to evoke emotions and increase cognitive recall, making the
technique of using dramatic examples and detailed descriptions common in a
variety of forums and for a range of purposes.
The European Union, for
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example, has required cigarette packages to feature images of diseased lungs.344
Other similar campaigns have been launched and promulgated with substantial aid
from such methods.345
Certain types of occurrences provide fertile ground for subsequent vivid
accounts. Dramatic environmental events, such as natural disasters, have received
the lion’s share of attention, while other, arguably more harmful environmental
processes have gone relatively unnoticed.346 The visual impact and subsequent
mental imagery of a danger influences the cognitive availability of a risk. Some
risks lend themselves to cognitive indelibility. For example, “the impact of seeing
a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater
than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.”347
The vividness bias and the availability heuristic are related, in that vivid
depictions of events make examples of such events more cognitively available.348
Historical illustrations make the point best. As Cass Sunstein has noted, “with
respect to terrorism, the attacks of 9/11 are highly salient, in a way that is likely to
lead people to perceive a strong likelihood of a future attack or perhaps to neglect
344
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the question of probability altogether, focusing instead on the worst that might
happen.” 349 In contrast, some hazards are inconspicuous, slow to develop, and
subtle as their approach. An example is slow-growing cancers.350 The risk from
such cancers is very serious, and may be statistically more devastating than other
types of risks.351 However, because the danger is less dramatic and the effects are
hidden, and less vivid, this type of harm is less easily brought to mind than other
types of harms, such as tsunamis, tornados, and other dramatic weather events,
plane crashes, and explosions.352 The latter categories of events are not only
easier to retrieve, but they involve images that are prone to slow cognitive decay.
353

E.

The Media and Risk Perception

What the media chooses to report has important implications for how
members of society perceive risks.354 The infamous Love Canal situation has been
cited as an example of the media’s powerful role in shaping public perception.355
Initially alarming reports caused widespread concern, and subsequent attempts to
revise initial estimates of harm were ineffective in reassuring the public.356
Media players can act as risk communication facilitators in the same way that
famous personalities and organized public interest groups can. Moreover, socalled availability entrepreneurs of all stripes utilize mass media outlets to spread
their message.
1.

Constraints and Goals of the Media

The news media is constrained by three factors; deadlines, resource
limitations, and geographical factors.357 At times the realities of a developing
story and a firm deadline force journalists to file a partial story, which may not
include all of the important details, or may not even be able to provide the most
349
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relevant details of the story, depending upon whether the bulk of the information
is gathered after a deadline.358 Newspapers face the most difficult deadline
constraints, while radio, television, and the internet are less affected by
deadlines.359
As with any industry, media outlets have specific goals. General goals for
media include constructing audiences and maximizing profits.360 Like any other
industry, the media seeks to make a profit361 by decreasing expenses and
increasing revenue.362 Although advertising is the most effective method for
increasing revenue, another strategy for increasing profit is to grow audience size
by increasing the attractiveness of content.363 The most direct way of augment
audience size is to adopt a marketing perspective, paying special attention to the
types of stories that will generate the largest audiences.364 Often, unusual and
sensational news stories draw audiences.365 Recent commentary has discussed the
media trend toward gossip, celebrities, and sensationalistic stories.366 Story
formulas are another influence on what gets reported. 367Time constraints lead
reporters to resort to shortcuts, or story formulas, to generate material.368 The
reliance on these formulas can skew or even change the way the story will be
perceived by the public.369
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What the Media Reports

The media’s choice of what to report is often largely determinative of
what receives public attention.370 Media outlets tend to report on risks that
reporters and editors already deem to be of interest to the public.371 The initial
determination is a key factor in determining what news reaches the public. The
media tends to focus on risks that kill or injure numerous people at a single time
as opposed to risks that have a cumulative effect over a longer time span, such as
a year. 372Routine sources of danger and common risks are less newsworthy.
Catastrophes and unusual risks are novel and imminently sellable.373 The amount
of time it takes for an event to unfold, or to occur, also plays an important role in
how newsworthy a story is. 374 For example, environmental degradation such as
worsening water quality and deforestation is less likely to make it into the news
than a single environmental disaster, such as a tsunami, hurricane, or massive
flooding.375 Another factor important to determining what information will make
it into the media is whether there is a “human angle” to the story.376 Personal
accounts are particularly likely to engage the audience. 377 News stories that
focus on the trials of a single person are also more likely to contain salient details,
making the story more likely to be recalled and recounted.378
While reporters seek out compelling subject matter, story content is not
the only consideration. The types of sources available also influence which
stories are reported. The media tend to favor official sources as opposed to
alternative sources, and engage in relatively little independent investigation to
substantiate information from these sources, as opposed to the investigation
conducted to verify information provided by an alternative source.379 When the
story involves a crisis, such as a natural disaster, official sources are likely to be
particularly favored by the media. After most of the fallout from a crisis has
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passed, the media tend to become more critical of the sources they have used.380
Another factor influencing which sources gain access to the media is a source’s
resources. Greater resources allow certain sources of information to access the
media disparately. Well-heeled sources not only gain initial access to media
outlets, they also often outlast any opposition with fewer resources.381
The geological, cultural, or political focus of the reporter or media outlet
also influences that which is deemed newsworthy. Events that are of particular
personal, cultural, or political relevance to the audience are particularly likely to
be reported.382 Some have noted that the public’s apparent obsession with
celebrities often influences reporting choices. Risks that impact celebrities or
public figures receive greater attention than they would otherwise.383 While the
media is particularly interested in some kinds of subject matter, there are certain
types of stories reporters are careful to avoid. Some threats are categorized as
unpalatable, and rarely (or gingerly) reported. For instance, the media is much
more likely to report the murder or sexual assault of a child when the perpetrator
is a stranger, as opposed to a family member.384 Hence, although the incidence of
violence against women and children is much higher at the hands of family
members, media reports would lead to the conclusion that stranger attacks are
more frequent.385
3.

The Media as Facilitator: Social Amplification and Availability Cascades

When an event with negative effects occurs, it can serve as a signal,
portending future harm. 386 However, the degree to which the event assumes
significance for risk perception varies widely.387 The significance of a particular
380
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signal can be profoundly influenced by the degree to which it is broadcast and
portrayed in the media.388 In this role, the media acts as an amplification station
for the information. There are four ways in which amplification stations may
increase the social amplification of a risk, which are: volume, whether the
information is disputed, the extent to which the information is dramatized, and the
symbolic connotations to the information. 389 After information is sent out by an
amplification station and received, it can then be amplified again resulting in
behavioral responses creating secondary effects and possibly third-order effects.
These are ripple effects.390
In a first-order effect, a large volume of information flow about a
particular risk can serve to amplify the perception of risk. In a second-order
effect, extensive coverage of a particular event may result in increased attention
from the public, which may, in turn, result is additional media focus.391 To the
extent that the risk is debated, resulting uncertainty can increase public anxiety.392
Moreover, sensationalistic accounts of an event designed to increase interest, can
serve to heighten concern. Sensational new stories generally rely on vivid
reenactments or recounts, which increase awareness and memory for the event
long after initial exposure.393 Finally, symbolic language designed to heighten
drama is commonly employed, resulting in further amplification of risk
perception.394
The importance of memorable and emotionally relevant stimuli for risk
perception is critical to understanding the effect of the media in public risk
response.395 A death from an event such as an airplane crash is 6,000 times more
likely to be reported by the media than someone dying from cancer, although the
risk of death from air travel is far less than the risk from cancer.396 The media
also frequently increase coverage about events that occur with declining
frequency, while decreasing coverage about events that are increasing in
frequency. For example, media coverage of salmonella poisoning incidents is
decreasing even though the number of incidents is on the rise. 397Similarly, the
illuminating risk in its full complexity, [and] is sensitive to the social settings in which risk
occurs…[recognizing] that social interactions may either amplify or attenuate the signals to
society about the risk.”)
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number of stories reporting on dangers posed by environmental pollutants is
increasing, while pollution levels are declining.398 The media can mislead
members of the public, amplifying fear about some risks, while attenuating
concerns over other risks.399
In many ways, the media is a fitting note upon which to conclude this
Article. So much of the risk perception story is affected by communication
through media channels: Internet, television, newspaper, magazines, radio.400
Although the members of the public interpret information through their own
lenses, the manner in which the media frames the risk issue or debate
unquestionably has enormous effects on initial evaluations, and often these effects
are lasting. Moreover, the media is often used by non-media sources to control the
hearts and minds of Americans.401
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the current dearth of understanding how
individuals evaluate and assess risk is a serious problem from the perspective of
managing risk, and public reactions to risk events. Citizens’ views on risks are
not often considered systematically before risk decisions are made. Lack of
public input is problematic because, as recent commentary has noted, resource
allocation is never value-neutral—particularly where risk management is
concerned.402 For example, environmental law scholar Donald Hornstein asserts
that “the substance of modern environmental law is a composite of moral
decisions—about the levels of protection to be accorded such noncommodity
values as human health, aesthetics, and responsibility toward nonhuman species
and ecosystems—and instrumental decisions about the best way to achieve these
morally based goals.”403 All risk decisions involve judgments about the most
appropriate way to balance benefits against costs, allocate resources, and
distribute hazard potentials, and hence such decisions often implicate complex
and value-laden questions about equality and fairness.404
Although there is debate about how to manage risks (and who should
manage it), there ought not be any dispute as to the necessity of a comprehensive
public risk perception model. The need for a better understanding of how risk
398
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information is received and evaluated is manifest in data collected from survey
studies on individual attitudes about risk. Renown risk researcher Paul Slovic
notes that
a consistent result from psychometric studies of expressed preferences is
that people tend to view current risk levels as unacceptably high for most
activities. The gap between perceived and desired risk levels suggests that
people are not satisfied with the way that market and other regulatory
mechanisms have balanced risks and benefits.”405

If risk decisions are to well serve the public, they must be crafted with some
understanding of the needs and desires of the human-beings who are at risk.
The mandate for getting a handle on public risk perception is so profound
that it has served as a primary impetus for risk perception research to date. Risk
analysts—as members of society and the human race—have a critical role to play
in risk policy. However, judgments of risk analysts have limited value on their
own. Because experts are not outside of the cultural milieu, they, like others, are
influenced by inevitable cognitive patterns, emotion-based responses, and
political and moral concerns.406 Expert analysis and opinion should be informed
by careful consideration of the preferences of lay members of the public.
This article draws on prior empirical and theoretical work to develop a
comprehensive model of public risk perception that can assist risk managers and
inspire future discussion about the role of individual citizens in risk decisions.
Included in this analysis is not only a discussion of how the characteristics of a
risk influence citizens’ views, but also about how perceptions of risk are
influenced by features of the communication context, neutral and non-neutral
communicators, characteristics of any relevant subpopulation at risk, and cultural
factors, among other considerations. The compilation of factors presented in this
Article is designed not only to serve as a starting point for fresh consideration of
how hazards ought to be managed, it is also presented as a model for predicting
public risk response. Significant implications follow. Public panics may be
legitimate, or they may be more harmful than they are helpful. 407 Some
communication campaigns may be timely and informative, others may help to
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fuel a perfect storm, creating unnecessary anxiety and wasted effort.408 With
heightened awareness of the social and cultural factors that drive risk assessment,
lawmakers can better manage risks and address public risk responses proactively.
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APPENDIX: FIGURE 1—RISK PERCEPTION MODEL
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